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NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the formation of an interim legislature 
incorporating mainstream parties and Maoists, Nepal’s 
peace process hinges on writing a constitution that 
permanently ends the conflict, addresses the widespread 
grievances that fuelled it and guards against the 
eruption of new violence. Most political actors have 
accepted the Maoist demand for a constituent 
assembly (CA) tasked with framing a new dispensation, 
although royalists are worried over the future of the 
monarchy, which has in effect been suspended. The 
major challenge is to maintain leadership-level consensus 
while building a broad-based and inclusive process 
that limits room for spoilers and ensures long-term 
popular legitimacy. Recent unrest in the Tarai plains 
illustrates the dangers of ignoring popular discontent. 
Key political actors need to prepare more seriously 
for the CA. Led by the newly established United 
Nations mission in Nepal (UNMIN), the international 
community should pressure all sides to abide by their 
stated commitments and global norms and provide 
technical assistance to the electoral process. 
The interim constitution promulgated on 15 January 
2007 established a framework for constitutional change 
and enshrined the guiding principles agreed in earlier 
negotiations. The new constitution’s drafting process has 
to address the twin objectives of peacebuilding and 
longer-term political reform. It offers an opportunity to 
cement the Maoists’ integration into mainstream 
democratic politics, to determine the monarchy’s fate 
and to tackle long-standing ethnic, regional and caste 
fissures. But successful constitutional processes require 
a delicate balance of elite accommodations and broad 
public participation. If the joint mainstream party/Maoist 
leadership fails to balance these sometimes competing 
demands, or the process stalls, violent conflict may 
emerge once more. 
There is also a tension over timescales – a speedy 
process would maintain momentum but could cut too 
many corners. The elections and assembly will not be 
perfect but they have to be good enough: the polls 
must be plausible, and the assembly must be seen to 
work adequately. The initial arbiters of the election’s 
fairness will be a small number of critical domestic 
and international constituencies, primarily the major 
party leaderships and India. If their judgement is out 
of step with the national mood – as it often has been 
in the past – it will produce new problems. 
The constitutional process has to build a complex 
equilibrium among elites. It must provide political 
space for the Maoists while limiting their options to 
use violence or coercion against political opponents. 
The consolidation of a competitive multiparty system 
naturally bolsters the mainstream political parties but in 
the short term will heighten their differences with each 
other and may encourage a return to the less than 
edifying tactics of earlier parliamentary politics. 
Managing the transition in the palace’s role may also 
present difficulties: political leaders have skillfully 
stripped royal powers comprehensively but gradually, 
with no single step sufficient to prompt a backlash. But 
a decisive alteration of traditional power structures will 
still encounter resistance from conservative institutions 
– not just the palace but also elements of the army, 
judiciary and bureaucracy. 
So far the process has concentrated on building elite 
consensus at the expense of intense political debate or 
extensive public consultation. A handful of SPA and 
Maoist leaders have controlled closed-door negotiations; 
limited parliamentary scrutiny has not even extended to 
recognising the concept of an opposition. The interim 
constitution has granted the prime minister and cabinet 
sweeping authority, subject to minimal checks and 
balances; the compromised independence of institutions 
such as the judiciary has weakened the principle of 
separation of powers. The inclusion of provisions such 
as the unrestricted authority to grant pardons suggests 
that interim arrangements may enable the political elite 
to sweep past misdeeds under the carpet. 
Warnings of a “new dictatorship” are exaggerated but the 
peace process has so far delivered an oligarchy of party 
leaders rather than a popular democracy. Party leaders 
have shown little appetite for pluralism: the interim 
legislature will have no official opposition, royalist parties 
may be excluded from the CA, new parties will find it 
very hard to register for elections, and in any case, 
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“consensus” decisions will leave most power in the hands 
of party leaders. Ad-hoc pre-negotiation of important 
issues threatens to undermine the constitutional process. 
For example, the SPA-Maoist response to Tarai 
discontent was to push forward proposals for federalism, 
thus pre-empting any meaningful discussion of one of the 
CA’s central concerns. 
The demise of the 1990 Constitution illustrates that no 
new constitutional order will gain legitimacy unless it 
visibly incorporates public input. Diverse education 
efforts, including both local initiatives and internationally-
funded projects, have already begun; expectations of 
significant changes have been aroused. However, there 
are no institutional structures to channel, process and 
consider the results of consultation. The Interim 
Constitution Drafting Commission invited public input 
but lacked a clear mandate or adequate mechanisms to 
deal with submissions. The result was public frustration 
and dissatisfaction with the end product. The CA process 
will need to do better if it is to deliver greater legitimacy. 
Mainstream parties have devoted scant consideration to the 
difficult questions of procedure involved in constitutional 
reform. Few have embarked on internal changes to tackle 
their own problems of corruption, patronage and exclusion 
that fuelled support for the Maoists. Strengthening parties’ 
internal democracy and accountability would directly 
benefit the constitution-making process. 
The Maoists first agreed to join multiparty politics in 
November 2005. They need to use the transitional 
period and the CA elections, scheduled for June 2007, 
to justify this strategy to their cadres. This could 
encourage them to democratise and make the most of 
open political campaigning on their populist agenda 
but it will also tempt them to retain their tried and 
tested tactics of intimidation and coercion. To date, 
the picture is mixed: while they have not given up all 
illegitimate means, they are working to present a 
moderate, compromising image. 
It is to the credit of Nepal’s government and the Maoists 
that the peace process has largely been internally driven 
rather than internationally imposed and that the key 
political players have shown a willingness to recognise 
and learn from past errors. The international community, 
nevertheless, has an important, if ancillary, role in 
supporting the constitution-making process. In addition 
to funding grassroots education, donors should build on 
the country’s considerable intellectual capital, for 
example by funding publications, radio shows and news 
articles by local scholars, lawyers and activists. Aid that 
promotes transplanted models or that pursues donors’ 
narrowly conceived political goals, however, would 
likely be counterproductive. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Government of Nepal and the Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
1. Commit publicly that elected delegates to the 
constituent assembly will abide by the principles 
listed in the preamble of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) so that the constitution to be 
drafted reflects those principles. 
2. Commit publicly before the constituent assembly 
convenes to abstain from trading off constitutional 
goals for short-term legislative purposes. 
3. Enact a law, in accordance with Article 79 of the 
interim constitution, stipulating transparent agenda-
setting procedures for the constituent assembly in 
both plenary and committee sessions. 
To the Interim Government of Nepal (once formed): 
4. Establish a professionally-staffed commission 
with a clear mandate to: 
(a) prepare options for constitutional provisions; 
(b) manage a process of public submissions, 
including the preparation of public 
education materials and the facilitation of 
public outreach; 
(c) synthesise and analyse public submissions 
received and prepare detailed summaries 
of the issues and demands raised by the 
general public; 
(d) issue a public report detailing how the 
constituent assembly discussed and, to the 
extent relevant, incorporated public input; 
and 
(e) communicate effectively to the public the 
progress and next steps of the process 
throughout the lead-up to, and life of, the 
constituent assembly. 
5. Clarify that the mandate of the constituent assembly 
in its capacity as a legislature will be narrowly 
construed to cover solely issues that must be 
resolved before the creation and convening of an 
elected, true legislature under the new constitution. 
6. Enact rules to maximise the transparency of the 
constituent assembly’s deliberations by, for 
example, providing for press coverage of, and 
public access to, all plenary sessions and limiting 
the number of closed committee sessions. 
7. Demonstrate willingness to engage in serious debate 
with parties not represented in government so as to 
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encourage them to play the role of a constructive 
opposition. 
To the Mainstream Political Parties: 
8. Carry out internal reforms in line with Article 
142(3)(c) of the interim constitution, including 
the setting of minimum quotas, to improve the 
representation and participation of women and 
minorities such as dalits and ethnic groups in 
party bodies such as central committees. 
9. Establish internal rules to promote transparency and 
increased debate so as to diminish the importance of 
patronage as a factor in intra-party decision-making. 
To the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): 
10. Renew the commitment made in the CPA to a 
constituent process that is “without any kind of 
fear” by: 
(a) announcing that all private and government 
public education efforts related to 
constitutional reform will be permitted 
without interference or violence; 
(b) allowing the police, as agreed in the CPA, 
to maintain order and investigate criminal 
activities; and 
(c) committing publicly to respect freedoms 
of speech and political association of 
other political parties and other entities 
engaged in mobilisation or education in 
the run-up to the constituent assembly. 
To India, the U.S., the European Union and Other 
Members of the International Community: 
11. Maintain coordination and avoid duplicative or 
conflicting efforts by consulting with each other 
and, where appropriate (as, for example, in electoral 
assistance), making use of the coordinating capacity 
of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). 
12. Use the forthcoming Nepal Development Forum 
to develop a coordinated approach to development 
aid and peace process support. 
13. Facilitate an inclusive and effective process of 
public consultation in the run-up to the constituent 
assembly by: 
(a) supporting ceasefire monitoring and the 
creation of democratic space politically, 
practically and financially, for example, 
by strengthening institutions such as the 
National Human Rights Commission; 
(b) maintaining pressure on the Maoists to 
refrain from politically-motivated violence; 
(c) encouraging the funding of radio and 
television content and books and magazine 
articles by Nepalis that broaden and clarify 
the debate on constitutional issues; and 
(d) providing financial and technical assistance 
if the government creates a commission-
like body to mediate public input. 
14. Provide funding for an inclusive and effective 
process of public consultation, while: 
(a) scrutinising funding directed to “grassroots” 
public education to ensure that projects 
benefit their target groups rather than merely 
their implementers; and 
(b) avoiding the funding of home-country 
experts who seek to transplant foreign 
constitutional models. 
15. Provide technical support to intra-party efforts to 
foster discussion of constitutional issues, without 
pressing for transplantation of features of donor 
nations’ constitutional arrangements. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 26 February 2007 
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NEPAL’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recognition that constitutional change would be an 
essential part of a viable peace deal in Nepal grew 
steadily following failed peace talks in 2001 and 
2003.1 The Maoist demand for a constituent assembly 
(CA) – a decades-old proposal that has enjoyed the 
support of many political forces at different times – 
grew in acceptability subsequent to the February 2005 
royal coup.2 It was formally endorsed by the 
mainstream Seven-Party Alliance (SPA)3 in November 
2005, when it signed a twelve-point agreement 
pledging to work with the Maoists towards “full 
democracy”.4 Although the palace resisted fundamental 
change, King Gyanendra recognised defeat when 
forced to relinquish power in the aftermath of mass 
protests in April 2006. He asked the SPA to resolve 
“the ongoing violent conflict and other problems 
facing the country according to [its] roadmap”, which 
by then included the commitment to elect a CA with 
Maoist participation.5 
Negotiations after the April 2006 transfer of power 
were sometimes difficult but neither side reneged on 
this understanding. The 21 November 2006 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) placed 
 
 
1 Recent Crisis Group analysis on Nepal includes Crisis Group 
Asia Report N°111, Electing Chaos, 31 January 2006; Crisis 
Group Asia Briefing N°49, Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising 
International Influence, 19 April 2006; Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°115, Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, 10 May 
2006; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°126, Nepal’s Peace 
Agreement: Making it Work, 15 December 2006. Earlier 
reporting is available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
2 Crisis Group Asia Report No99, Towards a Lasting Peace in 
Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, 15 June 2006, pp. 3-5. 
3 The parliamentary parties that make up the SPA are the 
Nepali Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified 
Marxist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(Anandidevi, NSP (A)); Nepali Congress (Democratic, 
NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers and Peasants 
Party (NWPP); and United Left Front (ULF). 
4 Crisis Group Asia Report No106, Nepal’s New Alliance: The 
Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2006. 
5 Royal proclamation, 24 April 2006, reproduced in Crisis 
Group Report, From People Power To Peace?, op. cit., p. 31. 
constitutional change at the heart of peacebuilding 
and efforts to tackle deep-seated economic and social 
inequalities.6 It stipulated that elections for a CA 
should be completed by mid-June 2007. The interim 
constitution promulgated on 15 January 2007 detailed 
electoral mechanisms and laid ground rules for the 
CA’s functioning.7 
Successful constitution making depends on two 
related, but distinct, processes: building a new 
consensus among the political elite that incorporates 
the Maoists into a democratic mainstream, and 
recognising the Nepali people’s right to a say in their 
constitutional future through structured public 
consultation that is incorporated into constitutional 
deliberations. This report considers procedural aspects 
of the constitutional process and makes recommendations 
in these areas, while touching only in passing on 
substantive issues, such as the role of the monarchy, 
state restructuring and methods for building an 
inclusive society, which are for the people to decide. 
 
 
6 Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. The 
full text of the CPA is available at http://www.ekantipur.com. 
7 The interim constitution is available at 
http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2007/jan/jan15/Constituti
on_2063.doc (in Nepali); no reliable English translation is 
publicly available. Its provisions may yet be altered; it can be 
revised by a two-thirds vote in the interim legislature and 
many politicians have indicated that they will be seeking 
amendments (see below). 
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II. THE END OF THE 1990 
CONSTITUTION 
A. IN WITH A BANG 
The 1990 Constitution was widely celebrated by 
Nepalis as “the best constitution in the world”.8 The 
country’s fifth, it was the first to embody the spirit of 
a mass movement and to be drafted largely by political 
parties representing popular aspirations.9 However, 
the nine-member Constitutional Recommendation 
Commission formed after the movement was only an 
advisory body, not a drafting commission, and its 
members were not elected. It was limited by a 
mandate to create a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliamentary system and was subject to strong palace 




8 This assessment was still widely used in the country until 
surprisingly recently. Even after its apparent collapse, one 
journalist asked of a drafter: “As one of the framers of the 
constitution of the kingdom of Nepal, 1990 – which is 
considered one of the best constitutions of the world – what do 
you think is the major reason for its failure?” Pratibedan 
Vaidya, interview with Justice Laxman Prasad Aryal, 
nepalnews.com, 21 May 2006. For activists who long opposed 
its provisions, the claim that it was “the best” was a focus for 
criticism. In the wake of early 2007 protests, one activist 
complained that “the 1990 Constitution was even claimed by 
some quarters as ‘the best constitution in the world’. Then 
why do Nepalese people have to fight again and again in the 
name of same ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ even after that?” 
“Nominal federalism”, madhesh.com, 17 February 2007. 
Supporters of the 1990 Constitution used the same terms to 
mourn its passing: “Acclaimed as one of the best constitutions 
of the world, the Constitution of Kingdom of Nepal 1990 has 
been sent to dustbin”, Keshab Poudel, “Political turmoil”, 
Spotlight, 19 January 2007. 
9 Nepal had four earlier constitutions: a January 1948 
document issued by the Rana regime; a transitional Interim 
Government Act of 1951; and King Mahendra’s constitutions 
of 1959 (multiparty parliamentary) and 1962 (partyless 
Panchayat). For a more detailed discussion of these, see Crisis 
Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal, op. cit., pp. 
3-5. 
10 Two royal representatives (Pradyumna Lal Rajbhandari and 
Ramananda Prasad Singh) were included in the commission 
(alongside three NC, three communists and the neutral chair, 
Bishwanath Upadhayay). Narahari Acharya, 
Sambidhansabha: sambidhanma janatako swamitwa ra 
apanatwa (Kathmandu, 2005), p. 17. The Royal Nepalese 
Army also made strong representations to pressure the interim 
prime minister to preserve royal powers. Interim Prime 
Minister K.P. Bhattarai, interviewed in Martin Hoftun, 
The 1990 dispensation suffered from two critical 
weaknesses. First, the drafting process came to be 
widely criticised for its exclusivity.12 Apart from the 
Maoists, activists representing smaller parties and 
ethnic or regional movements complained it was a 
private deal made by powerful parties and the 
palace.13 Even the UML, which was represented on 
the commission, was not happy with the final version 
and only expressed “critical support”. The commission 
received submissions from the public, the “vast 
majority” concerning ethnic, linguistic and religious 
issues, but it neither publicly acknowledged nor 
incorporated them.14 
Secondly, the 1990 Constitution failed to stabilise 
relations between the monarchy and democratic 
political forces. This failure long preceded King 
Gyanendra’s encroachments on power following the 
May 2002 dissolution of the House of Representatives. 
Immediately after the constitution’s promulgation, 
King Birendra accredited the ambassador to France, 
Kalyan Bikram Adhikari, to other countries without 
the advice and consent of the council of ministers 
required by Article 35(2). He also nominated 
members of the upper house of parliament without the 
required input from the council of ministers. The 
1990 Constitution gave the palace no substantive law-
making role but Birendra thwarted legislation by 
declining to sign bills sent to him, referring them 
instead to the supreme court.15 Mainstream political 
parties neither checked these palace gambits nor 
                                                                                        
William Raeper and John Whelpton, People, Politics & 
Ideology (Kathmandu, 1999), p. 301.  
11 Krishna Hachhethu, “Transition to Democracy in Nepal: 
Negotiations behind Constitution Making, 1990”, 
Contributions to Nepalese Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, January 
1994, p. 112. 
12 Crisis Group interview, civil society observer of SPA-
Maoist negotiations, Kathmandu, October 2006. See also 
Krishna P. Khanal, Nepal’s Discourses in Constituent 
Assembly: An Analysis (Kathmandu, 2005), p. 1. This view is 
not universally shared. See Mukunda Regmi, Samvaidhanik 
vikas ra nepal adhirajyako samvidhan 2047 (Kathmandu, 
2005). 
13 Crisis Group interviews, ethnic activists, Kathmandu, 
October 2006.  
14 Hoftun et al., op. cit., p. 312. The resulting constitution 
acknowledged Nepal’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, but also 
endorsed its Hindu status and assigned priority to the Nepali 
language. Constitution of Nepal 1990, Arts. 4(1) and 6(1), 
reprinted in Ram Kumar Dahal, Constitutional and Political 
Developments in Nepal (Kathmandu, 2001). 
15 Surendra Bhandari, “Failure of the Constitution and 
Democracy in Nepal,” in Surendra Bhandari and Budhi Karki, 
eds., Future of the Nepalese Constitution (Kathmandu, 2005), 
pp. 40-42. 
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established conclusive authority by delivering stable, 
clean and effective government.16 
B. SECOND THOUGHTS 
Discontent with the 1990 dispensation converged 
with a five-decade-old popular sense of entitlement to 
a CA. In September 1950, a Nepali Congress party 
conference in Bairgania, India, called for a “council 
or assembly” to “frame the constitution of the 
democratic state of Nepal”.17 On 18 February 1951, 
following the end of the century-long rule by 
hereditary Rana family prime ministers, King 
Tribhuvan announced that Nepal would be governed 
under a democratic constitution to be formulated by 
an elected CA.18 
After Tribhuvan’s death in 1955, the Nepali Congress 
renewed its call for a CA, and in December 1957, its 
leadership undertook a nationwide promotional tour.19 
Tribhuvan’s son and successor, Mahendra, undercut 
this campaign by promising an election without 
specifying whether for a CA or a legislature. In 
February 1959, Mahendra announced that the vote 
would be for a new parliament – but that he would 
grant a new constitution without a CA. In February 
1959, six days before national elections, he promulgated 
a constitution largely drafted by the British 
international lawyer Ivor Jennings, and 22 months 
later he used his emergency powers to arrest the 
prime minister and cabinet and institute full royal 
rule. His “Panchayat” system of government was 
formalised in 1962 in yet another constitution.20 
During the Panchayat era, Communist activist Mohan 
Bikram Singh advocated a popular CA.21 When a 
 
 
16 Hoftun et al., op. cit., pp. 187-214; John Whelpton, A History 
of Nepal (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 198-202. 
17 Khanal, Nepal’s Discourses in Constituent Assembly, op. 
cit. p. 42.  
18 Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic 
Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation 
(Berkeley, 1966), p. 91. According to the authors, King 
Tribhuvan hoped to hold elections to CA by April 1953; this 
proved elusive due to political in-fighting and instability in the 
new post-Rana order, ibid, pp. 174-175. 
19 Ibid, pp. 261-62. 
20 Ibid, pp. 212–13, 281-82; Whelpton, A History, op. cit., pp. 
98-101. 
21 Singh first presented the constituent assembly agenda at the 
Communist Party of Nepal’s 1961 plenum in Darbhanga, 
India, immediately after King Mahendra’s December 1960 
seizure of power. See Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting 
Peace in Nepal, op. cit. and Crisis Group Asia Report N°104, 
popular movement culminating in April 1990 brought 
down the Panchayat system, the Communist Party of 
Nepal (Masal), led by Singh, renewed this demand 
and boycotted the 1991 general election. Neither the 
Nepali Congress nor the UML, both represented in 
the 1990 constitution drafting body, took up this 
campaign.22 The Maoists, then known as the CPN 
(Unity Centre), were also not in favour; they participated 
in the 1991 election under the 1990 Constitution. 
Even when they launched their “people’s war” in 
1996, they did not call for a CA.23 They raised the 
issue when they put out feelers for talks with the 
government from 1999 onwards and first presented it 
as a formal demand during the 2001 peace talks. 
Gradually, their calls for a CA found echoes among 
cadres of other political parties.24 By April 2005, 
representatives of most major parties endorsed a 
“consensus…unambiguously in favour of CA”.25 
C. OUT WITH A WHIMPER 
Popular protests in April 2006 ended with King 
Gyanendra’s surrender of political powers to the 
mainstream parties.26 On 21 April, he invoked Article 
35 of the 1990 Constitution as the legal basis for a 
carefully limited transfer of authority, which would 
have established a new government under the old 
dispensation. The SPA rejected this offer. His second 
proclamation, on 24 April, recognised popular 
                                                                                        
Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, 27 
October 2005. 
22 Khanal, Nepal’s Discourses in Constituent Assembly, op. 
cit., p. 44; Krishna Belbase, “Politics of Constituent Assembly 
in Nepal,” in Mukti Rijal (ed.), Readings on Governance and 
Development, vol. vii (Kathmandu, 2006), p. 52. 
23 One of their original 40 demands submitted to then Prime 
Minister Deuba in February 1996 was that “a new constitution 
should be drafted by representatives elected for the 
establishment of a people’s democratic system”. They did not 
use the phrase “constituent assembly” and their thinking on 
the topic subsequently developed. For the 40-point demand 
see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Maoists, op.cit., pp. 40-41. 
A fuller translation of the point regarding the new constitution 
is given in Deepak Thapa, A Kingdom Under Siege 
(Kathmandu, 2003), pp. 189-194. 
24 Within the major mainstream parties the two most vocal and 
consistent advocates for a CA were Narahari Acharya (NC) 
and Shankar Pokhrel (UML). 
25 See “Constitutional Crisis in Nepal: The Way Forward”, at 
http://insn.org/?p=909. The conference was held on 23 April 
2005; the Nepali political party representatives were Krishna 
Sitaula (NC), Rajan Bhattarai (UML), Pradip Giri (NC(D)), 
Rajendra Mahato (NSP(A)); Swanaam (Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unity Centre-Mashal)) and C.D. Joshi (CPN (United)). 
26 See Crisis Group Report, From People Power To Peace?, 
op. cit. 
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sovereignty and reinstated the dissolved House of 
Representatives without invoking the 1990 Constitution.27 
This handover, justified by political necessity rather 
than legal process, left the status of the constitution 
unclear. Without a “formal declaration of nullity,” a 
prominent constitutional lawyer argued, the 1990 
Constitution remained de jure valid.28 Other 
constitutional experts concluded that it had been 
overtaken by events and lost de facto effectiveness.29 
In the words of one political scientist, “the heart of it 
has been thrown out”.30 The two perspectives reflect a 
difference of opinion between those who believed that 
the 1990 Constitution had to be followed carefully in 
moving to a new system and those who believed that 
the people’s movement justified acting outside 
existing constitutional provisions. 
In practice, the legislative and executive branches 
selectively followed the 1990 framework. The 
restored House of Representatives acted without the 
upper house or king.31 Indeed, it quickly moved to 
strip the king of power. On 18 May 2006, it 
promulgated by voice vote a decree establishing itself 
as “sovereign” and “supreme”, removing the king as 
supreme commander of the army, asserting control 
over the royal succession, declaring the country a 
secular state and dissolving the Rajparishad (royal 
privy council).32 Nevertheless, the selective revocation 
of only specific articles strongly suggested that other 
parts of the 1990 Constitution remained in force. 
The SPA, led in effect by the Nepali Congress (NC), 
the largest parliamentary party, formed the government.33 
The council of ministers, which included the ULF 
 
 
27 This sequence of events is recounted in more detail in Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal: From People Power To Peace?, op. cit. 
28 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
29 Crisis Group interviews, constitutional lawyers, 
Kathmandu, October 2006.  
30 Crisis Group interview, political scientist, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. 
31 The 1990 Constitution defined parliament as the House of 
Representatives, the National Assembly (upper house) and the 
king. From May 2006 the Speaker of the House, not the king, 
signed acts to make them law. Crisis Group interview, 
Nilamber Acharya, former law minister, Kathmandu, 13 
October 2006. This was maintained in the interim constitution. 
See Interim Constitution, Art. 87. 
32 Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit., p. 4. 
33 The NWPP did not quit the SPA but declined to join 
government. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace 
Agreement, op. cit. The composition of the House of 
Representatives (elected in May 1999) is: NC 71 seats, UML 
68, NC(D) 40, RPP eleven, NSP three, NSP(A) two, 
Janamorcha Nepal three, Samyukta Janamorcha Nepal three 
and NWPP one. 
despite its lack of representation in parliament, 
reflected a mixture of political expediency and 
legalism, corresponding only roughly with possible 
cabinet formulations under the 1990 dispensation.34 
Parliamentary committees engaged in some effective 
debates on new legislation regulating citizenship and 
the army; plenary sessions were less influential.35 
The 1990 Constitution’s uncertain status did not 
affect the day-to-day functioning of the courts and 
bureaucracy. “Constitutionalism is not only a written 
document, but practice and behaviour” observed a 
member of the 1990 Constitution Recommendation 
Commission. While much of the framework of 
written law has lapsed, he noted, unwritten 
conventions have sustained government.36 
 
 
34 Articles 35 and 36 of the 1990 Constitution vested executive 
power in a cabinet of ministers appointed by the king from the 
majority party in the House of Representatives.  
35 Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit., 
p.3; Crisis Group interview, senior journalist, Patan, October 
2006.  
36 Crisis Group interview, Nilamber Acharya, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. Other lawyers agree that the constitution is now 
more a matter of conventional practice than formal legal rules. 
Crisis Group interview, law professor, Kathmandu, October 
2006. An “unwritten constitution” is not a contradiction in 
terms; both the UK and New Zealand are described as having 
unwritten constitutions. 
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III. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
A. THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION DRAFTING 
COMMITTEE 
1. Process 
On 16 June 2006 the SPA and the Maoists reached an 
eight-point agreement, committing to “draft an 
interim constitution based on the twelve-point 
understanding and the ceasefire Code of Conduct” 
and “announce the dates for CA elections”.37 The 
following week, they formed an Interim Constitution 
Drafting Committee (ICDC) tasked with producing a 
draft within fifteen days.38 In the event, the ICDC 
submitted its draft to the SPA and Maoist negotiating 
teams only on 25 August. It had gaps, or lists of 
options, for key issues such as the fate of the 
monarchy and the electoral mechanism for the CA39 
but its 172 articles went into more detail about 
government institutions than is generally needed for a 
short transition.40 It received a frosty welcome. 
Constitutional lawyers described it as at best 
“incomplete”;41 one international expert described it 
as “a maximalist constitution without even minimal 
political agreement”.42 
From its inception, the ICDC was embroiled in 
confusion and controversy. Former supreme court 
judge and member of the 1990 Constitution Drafting 
Committee Laxman Prasad Aryal was asked to chair 
it. SPA and Maoist negotiating teams approached six 
other Kathmandu-based lawyers to make up the 
committee. One, Kathmandu Law School Dean 
 
 
37 The text of the eight-point agreement is available at 
http://www.kantipuronline.com/ kolnews.php?&nid=76803. 
38 Crisis Group interview, ICDC Chair Laxman Prasad Aryal, 
Kathmandu, 9 October 2006. 
39 Jeannie Shawl, “Nepal interim constitutional panel submits 
draft”, Jurist.com, 25 August 2006, at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2006/08/nepal-interim-
constitution-panel.php.  
40 In contrast, the proposed interim constitution drafted by the 
Maoists was extremely concise, only one-tenth the length of 
the ICDC document. “Interim Constitution of Federal 
Democratic Republic of Nepal”, CPN(M) draft. 
41 Crisis Group interviews, constitutional lawyers, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. One member described it as an 
essay rather than a draft constitution. See Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit., p. 7. 
42 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2006. 
Yubaraj Sangroula, declined, citing concerns about 
the secretive manner of appointment.43 
None of the members interviewed by Crisis Group 
had seen written terms of reference.44 They also 
offered conflicting accounts of the initial mandate. Its 
chair suggested that the mandate was from the outset 
limited to technical drafting matters and did not 
extend to substantive issues.45 One member, however, 
insisted there was no such limitation.46 
The ICDC’s composition – six men, no women, no 
dalits47 and no ethnic members – sparked public 
protest. A cross-party caucus of women politicians 
picketed the committee, and there were calls to 
include ethnic groups and dalits.48 Ten further 
members were appointed between late June and mid-
July.49 The process was slow because SPA and Maoist 
negotiators selected lawyers not only of the requisite 
social groups but also with party links reflecting the 
balance of power. Aryal expressed frustration at 
delays, warning that “an interim constitution might 
not be framed at all”.50 Advocates for ethnic and dalit 
groups remained dissatisfied.51 Enlarged membership 
 
 
43 Sangroula suggested that asking lawyers to reach the 
political compromises necessary for a constitution was “like 
getting seven vets to do heart surgery.” Crisis Group 
interview, Yubaraj Sangroula, dean of Kathmandu University 
School of Law, Kathmandu, 11 October 2006. 
44 According to a source close to the Peace Secretariat, written 
terms of reference for the ICDC did exist. Crisis Group 
interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. Another close observer 
of the process suggests that members received letters of 
appointment but these did not specify terms of reference. 
Email communication with Crisis Group, February 2007. 
45 Crisis Group interview, Laxman Prasad Aryal, 9 October 
2006. The initial Maoist representative on the ICDC agreed. 
Crisis Group interview, Khimlal Devkota, Kathmandu, 15 
October 2006. 
46 Crisis Group interview, Shambhu Thapa, ICDC member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006.  
47 “Dalit” is the term preferred by “untouchables” at the 
bottom of the traditional caste hierarchy to describe 
themselves. 
48 Crisis Group interview, international political analyst, 
Kathmandu, 10 October 2006. 
49 A list of ICDC members provided by the Peace Secretariat 
to Crisis Group included: Laxman Prasad Aryal (Chair), 
Harihar Dahal, Sindhunath Pyakurel, Shambhu Thapa, 
Mahadev Yadav, Khimlal Devkota, Agni Kharel, Pushpa 
Bhusal, Sushila Karki, Chhatra Kumari Gurung, Shanta Rai, 
Sunil Prajapati, Parshuram Jha, Chandeshwor Shrestha and 
Kumar Yonjan Tamang. Perhaps revealingly, it omitted the 
last appointed member, the dalit lawyer. 
50 “Suspicion aroused as constitution draft committee still 
incomplete,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5 July 2006. 
51 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 16 October 2006. 
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did not alter the fact that the ICDC was dominated by 
the SPA and Maoists.52 
2. Public participation 
ICDC efforts to secure public participation 
compounded the impression of elite control. The 
committee used announcements in daily newspapers 
to solicit comments but imposed a limited timeframe. 
Members attended NGO presentations in Kathmandu, 
and the public was permitted to make representations 
directly to the ICDC. More than 1,400 written 
submissions and “easily 2,000 to 3,000” verbal 
submissions were received.53 All political parties 
made recommendations, as did various international 
and domestic organisations, with ethnic and dalit 
groups tendering substantial submissions. Even the 
army gave views.54 
Meaningful public participation faced two problems. 
First, ambiguity about the mandate meant the public 
had no clear sense of what the draft would deal with. 
Many submissions related to features of a permanent 
constitution: a new legislature, reservations within 
government institutions and restructuring of the state 
into federal or provincial units.55 By failing to 
communicate the limited role of transitional institutions, 
the ICDC opened the floodgate on pent-up desires for 
substantive changes, creating expectations that were 
inevitably disappointed. 
Secondly, the ICDC lacked administrative machinery 
to process and analyse comments. Without this, it 
could not fulfil its implicit promise to take public 
opinion into account. It conducted an “initial analysis” 
of submissions to “pick out themes”56 but had only 
limited support staff, principally drawn from the 
Peace Secretariat, a body not staffed with constitutional 
 
 
52 Parliamentary parties such as the Rastriya Prajatantra Party 
and the Rastriya Janashakti Party were not represented in the 
ICDC although they did submit suggestions. 
53 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
54 Crisis Group interview, Peace Secretariat source, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
55 Crisis Group interviews, Tek Tamrakar, Pro Public, and Om 
Gurung, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Minorities (NEFIN), 
Kathmandu, October 2006; “International Day of the World’s 
Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous Nationalities Kathmandu 
Declaration 2006”, NEFIN, 9 August 2006. Internationally, 
the New York-based Center for Reproductive Rights 
submitted recommendations on women’s right to reproductive 
health care. Letter from Melissa Upreti to ICDC, 28 July 2006, 
at http://www.crlp.org/pdf/ww_Letter_to_ICDC.pdf. 
56 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006.  
lawyers.57 The ICDC made no public statement about 
how it had decided which submissions to focus on, or 
about how submissions were incorporated in the 
interim draft. The public could not determine to what 
extent, if any, its ideas were used, or whether 
submissions from powerful institutional actors such 
as the army received preferential review. In the 
absence of transparency, civil society leaders asserted 
that the ICDC had not even considered public 
comments.58 The government was secretive about 
submissions, refusing international experts permission 
to view them in order to prepare suggestions for 
analysing public views.59 
3. Substance 
The ICDC draft60 drew heavily on the 1990 
Constitution.61 As noted, it did not resolve key 
questions such as the fate of the monarchy and the 
electoral mechanisms for the constitutional assembly 
but it described in great detail governance principles 
and institutions. Part four, for example, listed six 
“directive principles of the state” (including 
transformation of “the national economy into an 
independent and self-reliant system”) and nineteen 
“state policies”.62 Where the 1990 Constitution 
contained thirteen detailed provisions on rights, the 
ICDC draft listed nineteen, including new rights to a 
clean environment, free basic health care, free 
education up to secondary level and an entitlement to 
employment or unemployment allowances.63 
The ICDC draft also provided considerable detail 
about the legislative branch (including fifteen 
 
 
57 Crisis Group interview, former Peace Secretariat official, 
Kathmandu, October 2006.  
58 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu and Lalitpur, October 
2006. 
59 International constitutional experts, email communication 
with Crisis Group, February 2007. 
60 “ICDC draft” refers to the ICDC’s final draft of 25 August 
2006 as submitted to the negotiating parties and published, 
and does not refer to earlier, internal ICDC drafts or 
subsequent, revised versions prepared by the negotiating 
parties. 
61 Crisis Group interview, former Peace Secretariat official, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
62 Part 4 of the 1990 Constitution, by contrast, listed five 
directive principles and sixteen state policies.  
63 ICDC draft, Arts. 17-19. The draft also contained detailed 
new provisions on women’s and children’s rights (Arts. 21, 
23), a right against caste discrimination and a right to political 
participation for previously excluded groups (Arts. 15, 22). 
These goals, however laudable, are the kind of long-term 
commitments properly reserved to a final constitution 
determined by democratically selected representatives. 
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complex provisions on the law-making process) and 
anti-corruption, public service and human rights 
commissions.64 In addition to provisions on the 
structure of the judiciary and the judicial council, it 
stated that the appointments of all judges would be 
terminated unless renewed within six months.65 But 
the draft could not resolve politically difficult 
questions. For example, it did not specify the form of 
an interim legislature and offered alternative ideas for 
Nepal’s division into a federal structure (a topic best 
not resolved by an interim constitution in any case).66 
4. Lessons 
The ICDC understood that no non-political body can 
substitute for the political accommodation and 
compromise that is a necessary part of constitution 
making. However, it could still have exercised its 
right to present a complete draft or offered more 
substantive options for political leaders to select from. 
The ICDC was also poorly coordinated – the lack of 
understanding among its members about its mandate 
was compounded by weak management and limited 
debate.67 
The challenge for a technical body is to channel 
expert and popular views into the negotiation process 
without derailing closed-door discussions. One 
observer close to the process suggested the ICDC 
might have functioned better with an explicit mandate 
to develop written formulations of alternative 
solutions identified in the negotiations and to engage 
in discussion with the negotiating teams.68 Its 
experience suggests that elite interests will trump 
popular participation if more is not done than merely 
opening the process to public comment. 
Despite its flaws, the nod towards participation 
granted some additional legitimacy to the 
constitutional change process. Both SPA and Maoist 
leaders acknowledge there were imperfections 
however, suggesting a learning experience. Lessons 
that can be drawn include: 
 
 
64 Draft interim constitution, Arts. 88-103, 125-32, 136-37. 
65 Ibid, Art. 168(2). Supreme Court justices had earlier agreed 
a thirteen-point recommendation for amendments in the 
interim constitution to protect judicial independence. “Justices 
submit memo for amendment in interim statute to CJ”, 
nepalnews.com, 9 January 2007. 
66 Draft interim constitution, Arts. 46, 144. 
67 In subsequent media interviews, Aryal himself admitted that 
the ICDC’s work suffered from various weaknesses. See, for 
example, interview with Laxman Prasad Aryal, Nepal, 10 
September 2006. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
Clear mandates promote effective transitional 
arrangements. There should be a sharp distinction 
between technical drafting bodies and political 
decision-making bodies. The ICDC appears to have 
moved back and forth between a substantive and a 
purely technical conception of its mandate. By 
inviting public submissions and drafting detailed 
constitutional language on, for example, human rights 
and the goals of the state, it asserted responsibility to 
make substantive commitments beyond its legitimate 
authority, risking the pre-emption of choices properly 
left to a democratically selected entity. The CA 
should allocate drafting responsibility clearly and 
make copies of draft options available not only to the 
delegates but also to the broader public. 
Meaningful public participation cannot be 
achieved solely by inviting public submissions. 
There needs to be a state body with the time and 
resources to process submissions, analyse them, 
submit findings to political decision-makers and 
report back to the public. It will be difficult for the 
CA to respond in plenary to public comments but a 
separately staffed commission or secretariat supporting 
the constitution-making process could do so. 
Maintaining effective communication with the 
public is an essential part of the constitutional 
drafting process. Miscommunication risks creating 
false expectations, which when unmet, weaken 
confidence in the transitional process and the ultimate 
constitutional framework. Management of expectations 
is a legitimate and necessary part of constitution 
making. Resources ought to be devoted to early 
communication of goals and functions for discrete 
phases of the constitution-making process. 
B. THE FINAL DOCUMENT 
1. How it was decided 
The SPA and the Maoists completed the interim 
constitution on 15 December 2006. The finished 
document was a modified version of the ICDC’s 
work. Despite a Maoist demand that it be promulgated 
within twelve days, it took a month – partly due to the 
desire to get the UN-supervised arms management 
process underway – during which the text was not 
officially released to the public, although copies were 
widely circulated. On 15 January 2007 the House of 
Representatives promulgated the interim constitution, 
dissolved itself (and the defunct upper house) and 
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opened the way for the formation of an interim 
legislature that immediately held its first sitting.69 
The final version was a product of political 
negotiation and compromise but it did not represent a 
true consensus. Provisions reflected competing party 
priorities – for example, the Maoist commitment to a 
“scientific land reform program” was included 
alongside the right to private property and a principle 
to encourage increased economic investment. Even 
the name of the interim legislature – the “Legislature-
Parliament” – is an awkward hybrid based on the 
Maoist preference for “legislature” and the SPA 
preference for “parliament” (which the Maoists feel 
carries bourgeois connotations). One constitutional 
expert complained that the document was “more 
politics, little constitution”.70 
All players have recognised that the final document is 
imperfect – even Prime Minister Koirala expressed 
doubts and called for revisions,71 while other parties 
have been more fiercely critical. Some SPA House of 
Representatives members had registered proposals for 
amendments before promulgation but withdrew them 
on the prime minister’s request. Amendments 
proposed by the opposition RPP, RJP and Janamorcha 
Nepal72 were rejected by the majority of the House. 
The motivation for including longer-term provisions 
was partly public pressure for serious reform but more 
importantly an enduring sense among party leaders 
that the transitional period will probably be 
prolonged; if the CA elections are delayed, they want 
the mandate to pursue changes.73 Koirala’s own call 
for amendments can be read as a further indication 
that delays are likely. 
 
 
69 The interim legislature is officially named “Legislature-
Parliament”. Its 330 members include 209 from the 
mainstream political parties and 73 from the Maoists. 48 seats 
were set aside to accommodate representatives of 
marginalised groups and “political personalities” – and also to 
include the ULF (which was not represented in the old 
parliament). In the end, apart from the Maoists, all other 
parties only appointed their own politicians (see below). 
70 Interview with Bhimarjun Acharya, nepalnews.com, 29 
December 2006. 
71 Rajendra Phuyal, “Sudhar gardai jana sakinchha”, Kantipur, 
16 January 2006.  
72 Janamorcha Nepal is a member of the SPA but its 
parliamentary representatives have split into three separate 
factions. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, 
op. cit. 
73 Crisis Group interviews, SPA and Maoists leaders, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
2. Major features 
The 330-member interim legislature will exercise 
law-making powers until the CA convenes (and 
assumes legislative authority alongside its constitution-
drafting mandate).74 Perhaps its most significant 
power is the ability, by two-thirds vote, to amend the 
interim constitution.75 Other law-making rules apply 
to both the interim legislature and the CA in its 
legislative capacity.76 As under the 1990 Constitution, 
“finance bills” are differentiated from other legislation 
and can only be introduced by the government.77 The 
interim legislature is not limited to transitional tasks – 
there is no prohibition on longer-term legislation. 
Like the ICDC draft, the interim constitution is 
detailed in a fashion more suitable to a durable, 
organic law than a transitional document. It contains 
167 articles and two schedules (on the national flag 
and the manner of its own entrance into validity). The 
retention of the ICDC draft’s provisions on 
fundamental rights and directive principles means that 
important decisions about the allocation of rights and 
resources have been made by an unelected and 
unrepresentative entity that operated without adequate 
public consultation. It is doubtful whether an interim 
constitution should contain such long-term provisions 
on complex and potentially divisive issues. Of course, 
a cash-strapped, stop-gap coalition administration is 
unlikely to do much in these areas, but declaring 
ambitious targets risks fostering public disappointment 
in the constitutional process and its interim 
institutions. Strangely, the interim constitution’s 
preamble does not mention the one solid demonstration 
of public will – the April 2006 people’s movement – 
that led to its creation. 
While the interim constitution makes few changes to 
the composition and structure of the judiciary, judges 
are required to swear an oath to it.78 The chief justice 
had his oath of office administered by the prime 
minister. These provisions led judges and lawyers to 




74 Interim constitution, Art. 45. 
75 Ibid, Art. 148. This is in line with the majority needed to 
adopt a provision of the new constitution.  
76 Ibid, Arts. 59 & 83. The Legislature-Parliament is 
empowered to create its own rules (Art. 57); when the 
Constituent Assembly forms it may create a separate 
committee “for the regulation of its regular parliamentary 
activities” (Art. 83(1)). 
77 Ibid, Art. 84. 
78 Ibid, Art. 162(2). 
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The new dispensation has carefully restricted its 
definition of pluralism. Members of parties, or 
individuals, who were opposed to the April 2006 
movement are banned from the interim legislature. 
(Twelve former parliamentarians had already been 
removed, and when the government realised that 
upper house member Lok Bahadur Thapa also had to 
be excluded because of his RPP(Nepal) membership, 
the 330-member legislature was reduced to 329-
before its first sitting.) The number of royalists 
affected is tiny: given that they would have been too 
few to block legislation, their exclusion suggests 
vindictiveness more than a practical need to guard 
against palace meddling.79 All parties represented in 
the interim legislature are automatically allowed to 
compete in the CA elections, even if they were not 
represented in the last parliament (thus including the 
CPN(M) and ULF). Other parties, whether old or 
new, have to re-register, and the smaller parties may 
find it difficult to assembly the required signatures of 
10,000 registered electors. 
3. Centralisation of power 
The interim constitution creates three branches of 
government, executive, legislative and judiciary, but 
tilts power heavily toward the executive. Executive 
power is vested in a council of ministers led by a 
prime minister, who in effect doubles as head of state, 
“no power regarding the governance of the country” 
remaining with the palace.80 The council of ministers 
appoints the army chief and makes up the national 
security council;81 it can declare a state of emergency, 
a power previously exercised by the king on the 
advice of the cabinet. Whereas the 1990 Constitution 
required parliamentary ratification of a state of 
emergency within three months, the interim 
 
 
79 The then Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-
General (PRSG), Ian Martin (subsequently appointed Special 
Representative), warned that the obstruction of royalist party 
activities threatened the legitimacy of the process: “I am 
concerned to have received complaints from two political 
parties that their activities have been obstructed.… I must 
stress that the right of all political parties to carry out peaceful 
activities throughout the country is essential for the credibility 
of the electoral process, and the credibility of the electoral 
process is essential for the credibility of the constitution-
making process”, press statement, OPRSG, 29 December 
2006, Kathmandu. 
80 Interim constitution, Arts. 137, 159. 
81 Ibid, Arts. 144, 145. The council of ministers is authorised 
to “control, mobilise and manage” the army. The powers of 
the national security council are not enumerated. Under the 
1990 Constitution, a national security council was tasked with 
advising the king on the army’s use, although its role was 
largely cosmetic, 1990 Constitution, Art. 118. 
constitution demands approval within a month and 
prohibits more than one extension.82 
The king’s power to “remove difficulties”, which 
proved a destabilising portion of the 1990 Constitution, 
is also transferred to the council of ministers (but not 
to the prime minister alone).83 Thus, although Article 
159(2) provides that the prime minister assumes the 
king’s constitutional powers, the most significant 
emergency powers are vested collectively in the 
cabinet. If the SPA’s constituents and Maoists take 
different stands, this will check any prime minister’s 
desire to consolidate power; however, should both 
favour emergency powers, there would be little 
chance for others to stand in their way. Diluting the 
authority of a prime minister who wields residual 
monarchical powers is especially important because 
this structure of executive power will persist, “after 
necessary adjustments” following the first meeting of 
the CA.84 A prime minister who is able to dominate 
the executive may be tempted to push for centralising 
power in a new chief executive, as opposed to a 
structure of checks and balances, in the hope that he 
will secure that position. 
In some respects, the interim constitution tips the 
balance of power toward the executive and away from 
the legislature. The “Nepal Government” – the prime 
minister and his council of ministers85 – can 
promulgate ordinances when the legislature is not in 
session.86 Key offices, including the chief justice of 
the supreme court, the chief commissioner of the 
commission for the abuse of authority, and the 
election commission, are in effect in the hands of the 
prime minister.87 The constitutional council, which 
has a pivotal role in several key appointments, is led 
by the prime minister and contains three ministers of 
 
 
82 Compare interim constitution, Art. 143, with 1990 
Constitution, Art. 115.  
83 Compare interim constitution, Art. 158, with 1990 
Constitution, Art. 127. Given the unhappy experience of 
Gyanendra’s invocation of Art. 127, it is surprising that it was 
replicated in the interim constitution. 
84 Interim constitution, Art. 44. 
85 Ibid, Art. 37(3). 
86 Ibid, Art. 88(1). This provision is similar to powers granted 
by the 1990 Constitution. The ordinance ceases to have legal 
force 60 days after the commencement of the next legislative 
session, Art. 88(2)(c). The interim constitution does not 
address the scenario in which more than 60 days elapse before 
the legislature meets, for example in a state of emergency. 
This leaves open as lawful the possibility of government by 
ordinance. 
87 Ibid, Arts. 103, 119, 128. The prime minister must appoint 
the chief justice and the election commissioners only on the 
recommendation of the constitutional council. 
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his choice, alongside the chief justice and the interim 
legislature speaker.88 
Given Nepal’s unhappy history of abusive executives, 
the lack of procedural constraints on the scope of 
executive power has prompted widespread concern 
among independent commentators.89 But the decision 
to concentrate power in the prime minister’s hands 
was deliberate. Most parties saw it as the best way of 
sidelining the monarchy; the Maoists also believed 
that it would help circumvent the conservative 
instincts of the bureaucracy and judiciary. The power 
structure raises one unavoidable practical question: 
who will succeed the ageing and ailing Koirala if he 
has to leave before the end of the transitional period? 
The constitution mandates the deputy prime minister 
or most senior minister to “act as the Prime Minister 
until a new Prime Minister is selected”.90 If 
expectations that the Maoists will gain the deputy 
prime ministership prove correct, their nominee 
would be first in line for the country’s highest office. 
 
 
88 Ibid, Art. 149. 
89 A conservative commentary warned: “By vesting all the 
executive, legislative and judicial authority upon the Prime 
Minister, the interim constitution has side-stepped 
internationally set constitutional norms and values. The Prime 
Minister is now de facto head of government as well as the 
head of state…this interim constitution lays the ground in 
which a dictator can be born although in the garb of a 
democrat”, Sanjaya Dhakal, “Interim Constitution: Laws and 
Flaws”, Spotlight, 22 December 2006.  
90 Interim constitution, Art. 38(10). 
IV. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
A. GOALS 
There is no clear set of substantive commitments 
defining the constitution drafters’ goal. Although the 
interim constitution specifies directive principles and 
fundamental rights, these cannot credibly bind the 
elected CA. Nevertheless, broad public agreement on 
core governance principles is reflected in the stated 
aims of the major parties. 
The CPA’s preamble lists the tasks of the new 
constitution: “progressive restructuring of the state”; 
resolution of “problems related with class, ethnicity, 
regional and gender differences”; and principles of 
“competitive multiparty democratic system, civil 
liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, complete 
press freedom, rule of law and all other norms and 
values of democratic system”. (The interim constitution 
echoes this list but does not demand that the eventual 
constitution must be in accord with it.91) These 
principles are largely beyond contention – however 
much they continue to be violated in practice. 
Arguably, the CPA binds both the SPA and the 
Maoists as political actors even if the interim 
constitution cannot directly bind the CA or its 
delegates. At a minimum, they commit the Maoists to 
political pluralism, ruling out immediate pursuit of a 
one-party state, and the mainstream parties to 
remedying regional, ethnic and caste divisions. 
A formal commitment by the SPA and the Maoists to 
abide by these principles during the CA could help 
stabilise the constitution-making process. Other 
nations have incorporated threshold substantive 
commitments in similar processes. South Africa’s 
November 1993 interim constitution, for example, 
contained 34 “principles” that limited choices in the 
ultimate constitutional text; the South African 
Constitutional Court reviewed the draft constitution to 
enforce those principles.92 In the Nepali context, 
institutionalised commitment to addressing exclusion 
issues would be a threshold response to long-standing 
grievances of marginalised groups. Public commitments 
 
 
91 Ibid, Preamble. In consequence, it would be difficult to 
argue that the interim constitution binds and limits the 
constituent assembly. But that is distinct from whether the 
SPA and Maoists are bound by the CPA. 
92 Siri Gloppen, South Africa: The Battle over the Constitution 
(Aldershot, 1997), and Nicholas Haysom, “Negotiating the 
Political Settlement in South Africa. Are there lessons for 
other countries?”, Track Two, vol. 11, no. 3. 
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could also strengthen consensus and hence the 
coherence of the resulting document.93 
B. ELECTIONS 
The interim constitution’s provisions for the CA 
electoral system were not fully elaborated and 
prompted protests at a perceived failure to address 
inequalities in representation. As earlier agreed in the 
CPA, the interim constitution provides for a 425-
member CA – 205 elected through a first-past-the-
post system (FPTP); 204 elected via proportional 
representation; and sixteen “distinguished persons” 
selected by the interim council of ministers.94 Voters 
will probably cast two ballots, one for the 
majoritarian system, and one for the proportional 
system (in which the entire country will be treated as 
a single district).95 However, the selection of which 
proportional method was the subject of lengthy 
debate, as was the question of whether there should be 
separate ballot papers. 
In response to the protests in the Tarai plains,96 the 
government and Maoists have agreed to alter the 
structures set out in the interim constitution. It had 
specified that the FPTP electoral units would be based 
on the existing parliamentary constituencies last used 
in 1999, although it did not specifically prohibit the 
redrawing of boundaries.97 It also echoed the CPA 
stipulation that parties “should ensure proportional 
representation of oppressed groups, regions, 
Madhesi,98 women, Dalit, and other groups”99 without 
indicating how this should be done – a problematic task 
given that these are diverse, ill-defined, and 
overlapping groups. In the wake of Tarai unrest, the 
government has promised to redraw constituencies 
and increase their number there, as well as take other 
 
 
93 For discussion of how a famous constitutional drafting 
process (the U.S.) achieved coherence, see William H. Riker, 
“The Lessons of 1787”, Public Choice, vol. 55, 1987, p. 9. 
94 Interim constitution, Art. 63(3).  
95 Interim constitution, Art. 63(3)(b). 
96 The Tarai is the strip of low land that runs the length of the 
border with India. Due partly to migration from the hills since 
the 1960s, it is now home to around half of Nepal’s 
population. 
97 Interim constitution, Art. 63(3)(a) speaks of districts 
“determined by the existing law prior to the implementation of 
this constitution”. This could cover either present districts or 
redistricting in accord with pre-interim constitution principles. 
98 “Madhesi” is the term by which Tarai residents (excluding 
migrants from the hills) prefer to describe themselves, 
although it can also be used pejoratively. 
99 Interim constitution, Art. 63(4). 
measures to ensure a more directly proportional 
system.100 
Political compromise was always likely to produce a 
complex electoral system.101 The Maoists argued for 
proportional representation,102 hoping it would allow 
them to aggregate geographically diffuse support; the 
NC hoped to preserve its advantage under the 1990 
system; the UML argued for a hybrid system with 
proportional voting within regional, rather than 
nationwide, units.103 However, no final decisions on 
the electoral system have been put into law, and the 
election commission, which has started informal 
preparations, is calling increasingly urgently for the 
legal authority it needs to proceed. 
Both large mainstream parties favour a parallel 
system in which their (probably significant) total of 
FPTP seats would be complemented by a share of the 
proportional seats in direct relation to their 
performance in that half of the poll. Others are 
pressing for a mixed member proportional (MMP) 
system, in which the proportionally allocated seats 
would bring each party’s total representation 
(including constituency seats) in line with its share of 
the vote. This would undermine the advantages the 
larger parties would gain from the FPTP system, 
which can yield a majority of seats to a party even if it 
gets far less than a majority of votes. In late February 
2007, an SPA-Maoist taskforce reportedly decided to 
use the parallel system and confirmed that there 
would be separate ballot papers and boxes for the 
FPTP and proportional votes.104 
The mixed system may thus be controversial but may 
also yield a significant unintended benefit: an 
 
 
100 These measures were promised in an address to the nation 
by Prime Minister Koirala on 7 February 2007; a bill 
incorporating amendments to the interim constitution 
reflecting them was introduced to the interim legislature on 18 
February. 
101 Correcting some of the flaws of the 1990 system would not 
necessarily improve the representativeness of the overall 
system. A new census - needed to redraw accurate single-
member districts - is not possible; even redrawn equi-
populational districts could be gerrymandered to skew results. 
In the Tarai, for example, many districts form thin north-south 
strips, diluting the Madhesi vote with votes from the hill 
regions. 
102 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, Bhaktapur, 
October 2006. 
103 Crisis Group interview, Madhav Nepal, Lalitpur, October 
2006. Although this proposal was not adopted for the CA 
elections the UML may advance it for future elections under 
the new constitution. See below. 
104 “Double ballot boxes, double ballots agreed”, Kathmandu 
Post, 23 February 2007. 
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assembly equally elected by proportional 
representation and by single-member districts would 
not have a natural bias toward one particular system; 
the public would be able to see whether different 
mechanisms yielded different distributions of power 
and the experience could inform debate within the CA 
over which system to make permanent. 
The new electoral structure’s impact on the 
distribution of political power is difficult to predict. It 
hinges on factors such as the type of proportional 
system adopted, the extent of mainstream party 
mobilisation outside district centres and the relative 
populations within districts (which has changed due 
to the conflict and may change again with efforts to 
return internally displaced persons). There also 
remain difficult questions about implementation of 
the 26 November 2006 citizenship law (particularly in 
the Tarai region) and reconstitution of the voter rolls 
(where the Maoist insistence on allowing internal 
migrants to register at their temporary addresses has 
led to friction).105  
Contrary to high public expectations, proportional 
representation is unlikely in itself to lessen the 
mainstream parties’ strength. Rather, the parties’ 
ability to designate lists for the proportional 
representation portion of the poll will provide a further 
lever for controlling representation in Kathmandu. 
Adding proportional representation to the mix could 
even increase the centralisation of political authority 
by weakening local control and scrutiny of political 
candidates. The decision to create a single national 
electoral district further distances elected representatives 
from local communities while heightening their 
dependence on leadership patronage to secure a 
favourable position on party lists.106 If the existing 
single-member districts remain badly apportioned,107 
the new electoral system may not be more 
representative than its predecessors. If it is to make a 
difference, regulations that force parties to make their 
selection of candidates inclusive will be necessary, 
something that may be included in new legislation.108 
 
 
105 Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit., p. 14. 
106 Proportional representation will not in itself ameliorate 
social and political divides. See Crisis Group Report, Toward 
a Lasting Peace in Nepal, op. cit.; Giovanni Sartori, 
Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into 
Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York, 1997), pp. 
58-61.  
107 Crisis Group interview, international electoral expert, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
108 “Act to tame parties in the offing”, Himalayan Times, 22 
February 2007. Maoist leader Dinanath Sharma said the 
CPN(M) had insisted on including a clause in draft legislation 
C. PROCEDURES 
The CA will convene on the 21st day after election 
results are issued.109 The interim constitution 
establishes an unusual decision-making system. The 
question of the “continuance of the monarchy” is 
straightforward: the CA must decide this by “simple 
majority in the first meeting”.110 However, the 
remaining provisions are expected to be adopted 
unanimously, with time-consuming procedures for 
fresh consultations and voting if there is even one 
opposing vote. Each provision will be voted on in 
sequence and adopted if a quorum of two-thirds is in 
attendance and no opposing votes are cast.111  
Failing this, parliamentary party leaders must “consult 
each other to achieve consensus in such matters”.112 
This consultation has to be completed within fifteen 
days and a fresh vote held within a further seven days – 
again with the requirement of unanimity for 
adoption.113 If there is still opposition, a final vote can 
pass the provision by a two-thirds majority if there is 
also a participating quorum of at least two-thirds of 
the CA.114 Separately, an absolute two-thirds vote can 
decide to refer to referendum “a decision on any 
matters of national importance, except when this 
conflicts with provisions elsewhere in the constitution”.115 
This excludes, for example, a referendum on the 
monarchy.116 
                                                                                        
requiring parties to include representation from all regions and 
communities. 
109 Interim constitution, Art. 69(1). 
110 Ibid, Art. 159(3). 
111 Ibid, Art. 70(1)-(2). It is unclear from the text what happens 
if members in attendance abstain from voting. 
112 Ibid, Art. 70(3). 
113 Ibid, Art. 70(4)-(5). 
114 Ibid, Art. 70 (6). 
115 Ibid, Art. 157. It is unclear whether the CA can order a 
referendum on constitutional provisions, as the procedure for 
decision is specified in the interim constitution; it may be that 
the interpretation of “matters of national importance” would 
be restricted in practice to non-constitutional issues. 
116 Interim constitution, Art. 159(3) applies “notwithstanding 
anything contained elsewhere in this Constitution”, including 
Article 157. The two-third voting rule is designed to 
encourage efforts to forge fairly wide consensus and does not 
appear contentious, though in other national contexts a similar 
rule has been the subject of considerable controversy. Between 
August 2006 and January 2007, for example, the Bolivian 
constituent assembly was deadlocked as the governing party 
and its opponents locked horns on whether to have a simple 
majority (the former’s preference) or a two-thirds majority 
rule. In January 2007, the governing party agreed to a two-
thirds rule, but supported violent street protests that threatened 
to sink the constituent assembly. See Crisis Group Latin 
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These provisions address certain potential problems 
but also raise their own difficulties. Disposing of the 
most emotive issue – the monarchy – at the outset 
should avoid the polarising danger of a referendum 
but could sour later debates as one group of delegates 
will have secured an enormous and immediate victory 
while others will have suffered a substantial setback. 
This risks making compromise and negotiation within 
the assembly more difficult; the result of the 
monarchy vote could also prompt spoiling efforts by 
disaffected outside groups.  
Following the initial high-pressure meeting, the 
structural bias towards consensus-based decisions 
may either assuage tempers or allow losers to vent 
their frustration by obstructing progress. The unusual 
insistence on unanimity could push even barely 
contentious provisions to political party deliberation 
and a second or third vote. Delegating second-order 
deliberations to “political leaders” would shift 
authority from the elected body and invite a 
continuation of the top-level backroom deals that 
characterised the earlier peace negotiations. The 
provision for flexibility over referendums is sensible: 
constitution-making bodies often re-engineer their 
mandates and procedural rules when faced with 
unexpected consequences.117 
The interim constitution is silent on a number of 
significant matters. Critically, it says nothing about 
how the CA will generate provisions or decide how to 
vote on them. For example, if different parties put 
forward competing versions of the same provision no 
means is specified for determining which to vote on 
first. Yet, the power to set the voting agenda can be 
decisive: where there are multiple options the 
sequencing of votes can shape the outcome.118 Here, 
too, important second-order decisions may well 
devolve to party leaders in closed-door discussions. 
This could emasculate the CA, with opaque private 
deliberations undermining public trust.  
Options for discussion might be drafted by a technical 
entity such as the ICDC, although its weaknesses 
would have to be addressed in a new body. The 
                                                                                        
America Briefing N°13, Bolivia’s Reforms: The Danger of 
New Conflicts, 8 January 2007. 
117 Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, 
Precommitment, and Constraints (New York, 2000), pp. 105-
107. 
118 In the 1787 Philadelphia Convention that drafted the U.S. 
Constitution, for example, advocates of a strong federal 
government were able to set the course by opening debate 
with their model constitution, the Virginia Plan. Jack N. 
Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making 
of the Constitution (New York, 1996), pp. 59-70.  
alternative texts for different constitutional provisions 
that it listed were simply those supplied by the parties 
themselves rather than by neutral experts. Alternatively, 
cross-party CA committees with technical support 
could carry out this task. In either case, a separate 
drafting body would develop options which would be 
available both to the plenary and the general public 
for critical examination. Issues such as these may be 
addressed in the procedural rules of the CA but will 
have to be negotiated in advance. 
The interim constitution alludes to committees within 
the CA but leaves their responsibilities to be 
determined by a subsequent law or the CA itself.119 
This is an important topic and deserves careful 
scrutiny. Committees, rather than ad hoc political 
negotiations, should play a part in setting the CA 
agenda and voting order in accordance with clear pre-
established rules; they should also be subject to public 
scrutiny. Their composition is significant: a fair cross-
section of members with reasonable independence 
from party leaders would promote more open and 
vigorous debate. Arguably, any law regulating CA 
procedures would be subject to revision by the 
assembly itself: as the sovereign representative of the 
Nepali people, its authority supersedes that of the 
political factions that drafted the interim constitution. 
D. THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AS 
LEGISLATURE 
The CA’s dual function as constitution-making body 
and legislature was decided without detailed 
consideration of process-related implications. SPA 
and Maoist leaders cited only cost savings from a 
dual-function body as justification for their decision.120 
There are other practical justifications for the double 
role: once the CA is elected, the interim legislature 
would have minimal legitimacy and there is little 
reason to elect a separate legislative body 
simultaneously. However, the CA’s twinning of roles 
raises the possibility of negotiated trade-offs between 
short-term legislative and long-term constitutional 
issues.121 Such compromises risk undermining the 
integrity of the final draft. 
 
 
119 Interim constitution, Arts. 78, 79. 
120 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
121 The most common model for a dual-function 
legislature/constituent assembly is India’s 1946 Assembly. 
That body, however, “was, in effect, a one-party assembly, in 
the hands of the mass party, the Indian National Congress.” 
Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a 
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Like any other large elected body, a CA will be 
characterised by horse-trading and log-rolling. Given 
the high stakes – the power to rewrite the rules of the 
political game – members may employ greater efforts 
than usual to achieve their ends. In a combined 
legislature/constitution-making body, extra-constitutional 
resources (such as votes on ordinary legislation, 
favours outside political life) may become bargaining 
chips for constitutional issues.122 Constitution making 
always involves negotiated compromises between 
political visions, with the result that the final 
document is often a cumbersome blend of ideologies. 
However, limiting bargaining to constitutional issues 
makes sense: if delegates can bargain away important 
constitutional features in exchange for short-term 
party or personal gains, this will detract from the 
substance of the constitution and sap public confidence. 
There are ways of limiting this risk. First, a restricted 
mandate for the CA as legislature would limit 
opportunities for horse-trading. Although the interim 
constitution imposes no restrictions, party leaders 
could agree to avoid all but essential legislation 
before a permanent, and more legitimate, legislature 
is in place. Secondly, effective mechanisms for 
collecting and reporting public views could help to 
constrain improper bargaining by establishing 
independent benchmarks against which CA decisions 
could be assessed. Thirdly, public involvement and 
demand for transparency could moderate representatives’ 
behaviour. CA candidates could commit publicly to 
refrain from deal-making that links constitutional 
issues to short-term, parochial goals, while transparency 
in CA debates (with delegates having to explain their 
positions) would further limit improper bargaining. 
E. DURATION 
The interim constitution gives the CA two years to 
complete its work, with a possible six-month extension 
in case of a “declaration of an emergency 
situation”.123 This time-frame is consistent with recent 
international experience.124 Constitution-making 
                                                                                        
Nation (Delhi, 1966), p. 2. It thus did not have the tensions of 
a multi-party body.  
122 This has long been a pervasive feature of constitution-
making. See Jon Elster, “Arguing and Bargaining in Two 
Constituent Assemblies”, University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Constitutional Law, vol. 2, 1999-2000, p. 392. 
123 Interim constitution, Art. 64. 
124 East Timor drafted its constitution in about six months, 
Rwanda took 24 months, Uzbekistan fifteen and Kazakhstan 
eighteen. The Iraqi Transitional National Assembly elected in 
January 2005 had seven months to complete a constitution; the 
final product hardly impacted the country’s deep social and 
processes involving extensive public consultation and 
official responses, however, tend toward the longer 
end of the range. The need for a state of emergency to 
permit an extension could lead to difficulties. If the 
CA is deadlocked, with mounting tensions, there 
could be an unhealthy temptation to use emergency 
powers to short-circuit constitutional debate. This 
problem would be especially acute if emergency 
powers were de facto concentrated in a strong prime 
minister who wishes to retain power. The provision 
for an early dissolution of the CA (by resolution 
passed by its own members)125 also raises the 
worrying possibility of the constitutional process 
being suspended mid-way without any framework for 
the continuance of executive, legislative or 
constitution-drafting functions. 
Still, the schedule is feasible and sets a useful target. 
A slipping timetable would risk undermining public 
confidence by raising suspicions that key players 
were unwilling to hand over power. Delays in the 
CPA and interim constitution negotiations spurred 
public concern about the parties’ desire and capacity 
to deliver peace;126 both sides’ credibility was 
damaged by their inability to explain the slippage.127 
Further delays are unlikely to benefit either the SPA 
or the Maoists: if the momentum of the people’s 
movement and the peace process is lost, their 
opponents stand to gain, and too much messy 
“muddling through” might prompt nostalgia for more 
authoritarian rule. A process that hews to the original 
timeframe will not only be legitimate but may more 
accurately reflect the broader popular aspirations of 
April 2006. 
                                                                                        
ethnic conflicts. See Crisis Group Middle East Report No42, 
Iraq: Don’t Rush The Constitution, 8 June 2005. 
125 Interim constitution, Art. 64. 
126 The interim constitution failed to appear at the end of 
November 2006 as stipulated in the CPA. 
127 Some steps in the negotiations were explained. See, e.g., 
“Talks Adjourned on Positive Note,” Kathmandu Post, 9 
October 2006, p.1. But these were exceptions. 
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V. THE POLITICAL PLAYERS 
The constitutional transition will only be successful if 
it establishes democratic space and practices. None of 
the major political actors has a perfect record in this 
regard. The primary objective of the constitutional 
process is to protect democracy and fundamental 
rights by cementing the peace deal and the Maoist 
transition to multiparty politics, as well as removing 
the openings for power-grabs that the palace exploited 
under the 1990 dispensation. However, internal 
reform of the mainstream parties will also be essential 
if a more representative, responsive and inclusive 
democracy is to take root.128 
Dynamics within the interim legislature and CA may 
support these processes: there is little likelihood of 
the palace regaining any constitutional powers, the 
mainstream parties know it is in their interests to 
foreclose a possible resumption of the insurgency, and 
the Maoists have indicated they will push for a 
reformed multiparty system that does away with what 
they see as the weaknesses of the older, elitist model. 
But solid progress depends on closer attention to 
process and substantive issues and is prey to the goals 
of hierarchical leaderships who may find common 
cause in resisting certain changes. 
A. THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES 
1. Views on constitutional substance and 
procedures 
Party leaders did not focus on procedural questions 
(such as the CA’s mandate or rules for agenda-setting 
and voting) until late in the negotiating process. 
Substantive issues (such as the future of the monarchy 
and regional devolution) have received much more 
attention, and on some there is already detailed 
consensus within parties. 
Nepali Congress (NC). During the peace negotiations, 
the NC operated in its usual centralised way, key 
decisions being taken by the party president, G.P. 
Koirala, without consultation with the broader 
membership.129 Koirala took advantage of his developing 
 
 
128 This is true of other constitution-making situations. See 
Crisis Group Asia Report No. 56, Afghanistan’s Flawed 
Constitutional Process, 12 June 2003, pp. 27-29. 
129 The same was the case for the selection of the ten additional 
members of the interim legislature, where Koirala over-rode 
other party leaders’ wishes. See below and Bishwamani 
Pokhrel, “Pariwar moh”, Samay, 25 January 2007. 
personal relationship with Maoist leader Prachanda to 
push the process forward130 at the expense of building 
the party’s capacity to develop stable internal 
consensus on difficult issues.131 Different NC factions 
incline towards republicanism or preserving the 
monarchy;132 there is confusion about whether and 
how the state ought to be restructured. One central 
committee member explained that federalism was 
“out of the question” but that some Congress leaders 
would support provincial governments with elected 
assemblies and substantial budgetary authority – 
implying that NC is uncomfortable with the label but 
may concede an almost-federal structure.133 Other 
central committee members expressed reservations 
with this formulation, arguing that division of the 
country into discrete units would leave some sections 
vulnerable to “geopolitical” (i.e. Indian) influence.134  
In the event, the January 2007 Tarai unrest has pushed 
the party leadership towards accepting a joint SPA-
Maoist platform of federalism in a concession to 
Madhesi activists. The other major area of disagreement 
is over the crucial question of restructuring the army 
and integrating former Maoist fighters into a new 
national force. 
Congress thinking on the structure and functioning of 
the CA, a central committee member conceded, 
remains “in a rudimentary state”, although the party 
has long had a clear antipathy toward proportional 
representation, which is perceived (perhaps incorrectly) 
as threatening its electoral advantage.135 By delaying 
taking a position on the monarchy, NC has reduced 
royalists’ opportunity to rally before the CA elections 
and hopes to improve its chances of capturing 
generally pro-palace votes without permanently 
alienating its republican-inclined cadres. 
 
 
130 Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit.; 
Crisis Group interview, NC central committee members, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
131 To the extent an “established” route exists: it is by the word 
of the prime minister. Especially given the present prime 
minister’s age and health, this is hardly a durable solution. 
132 Crisis Group interview, political scientist, Kathmandu, 8 
October, 2006. 
133 Crisis Group interview, NC central committee member, 
Kathmandu, 14 October 2006. Federalism, particularly to the 
end of ensuring ethnic autonomy, takes many different forms. 
See Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating 
Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (Cambridge, 2000). 
134 Crisis Group interview, NC central committee member, 
Kathmandu, 19 October 2006. 
135 Crisis Group interview, NC central committee member, 
Kathmandu, 18 October 2006. 
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UML. The UML is also divided on substantive issues 
and little concerned with issues of process. The 
central committee has endorsed republicanism but 
factions within the party still quietly take divergent 
positions.136 The party favours proportional 
representation for a new national electoral system – 
the country would be divided into fourteen zones 
(probably the current ones), each with party lists that 
would have to include certain percentages of ethnic, 
women and dalit candidates. The zones would also be 
units on which some tax and resource allocation 
authority would be devolved.137 Leaders are less clear 
about the functioning of the CA (for example, voting 
rules and the division of labour between plenary and 
committee sessions). “There’s a need to study the 
realities of a constituent assembly”, a senior central 
committee member admitted.138 
NC(D). An offshoot of the NC, it has also reserved 
judgement on the monarchy, its hesitation partly 
prompted by the two parties’ possible reunification.139 
A central committee member, however, observed that 
his party was “more progressive” than NC and 
criticised the palace’s habit of disrupting 
democracy.140 Similarly, while the NC(D)’s January 
2006 general convention endorsed federalism, the 
party has taken no clear position on how this ought to 
be achieved.141 Despite adopting certain policy 
positions close to the CPN(M), the NC(D) (and 
especially its leader, Sher Bahadur Deuba) has been 
consistently critical of Maoists. 
Other SPA parties. For the NSP, key issues are 
proportional representation, citizenship for Madhesis 
and the introduction of federalism.142 Along with 
other Tarai-based political groups, it has criticised the 
interim constitution’s retention of the FPTP electoral 
system and demanded further reforms before polls 
 
 
136 Crisis Group interview, UML central committee member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006.  
137 Crisis Group interview, UML General Secretary Madhav 
Nepal, Kathmandu, 12 October 2006. 
138 Crisis Group interview, UML central committee member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
139 The two parties are likely to reunite before the CA 
elections. Crisis Group interviews, NC and NC(D) central 
committee members, Kathmandu, October 2006. See Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. for an 
explanation of the political calculations involved in 
reunification. 
140 Crisis Group interview, NC(D) central committee member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
141 Crisis Group interview, NC(D) central committee member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
142 Crisis Group interview, NSP(A) central committee 
member, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
can go ahead. The smaller SPA parties have had 
minimal impact on the negotiations, although in many 
cases they have more fixed positions on constitutional 
issues. 
Non-SPA parties. The traditionally pro-palace 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and Rashtriya 
Janashakti Party (RJP) are not part of the SPA and 
have had only a marginal role in post-April 2006 
events, despite being represented in parliament and 
seeking to operate as a constructive opposition. While 
they voted with the SPA to approve the interim 
constitution, both parties are pushing for amendments; 
the RPP has hinted that it will take a less palace-
friendly line but has yet to clarify new policies.143 
Neither party opposed the interim legislature’s 
condemnation of the king’s 19 February 2007 Democracy 
Day address that sought to justify the royal coup.144 
The parties’ concentration on selected substantive 
matters has overshadowed consideration of the 
procedural choices involved in constitution making.145 
This may explain some of the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies of the interim constitution but is not a 
crippling problem: the interim constitution’s enactment, 
with the formation and operation of interim institutions, 
will likely stimulate crisper views on process. 
2. Democratic reform 
Mainstream party behaviour will have a critical 
impact on the shaping of a new constitution and its 
democratic credentials.146 The dynamics of the 
process will present both opportunities and risks. The 
parties have acknowledged past failings, promised to 
change and are being pushed by the generally 
reformist public mood. The chances for positive 
change are much greater than when they had their 
 
 
143 The RPP has generated two more aggressively royalist but 
not very influential offshoots: the RPP (Nepal) and RPP 
(Nationalist). 
144 The interim legislature unanimously passed a motion of 
censure demanding government action against the king, 
“House directs govt to act against king”, Himalayan Times, 22 
February 2007. 
145 The two key issues are: the horizontal division of authority 
between the three branches of central government – 
legislature, executive and judiciary; and the vertical allocation 
of responsibilities between the national government and sub-
national units at the federal, provincial or local level. 
146 Parties, indeed, are “an essential part of the democratic 
system” because “it is political parties which set up the 
candidates, and campaign actively for votes” and embody “the 
constant flux of interest formation in society” in a way that 
more fixed constitutional settlements cannot. Sudipta Kaviraj 
(ed.) Politics in India (Delhi, 1997), pp. 255-261. 
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backs to the wall after the royal coup. However, the 
nature of coalition government in the run-up to a 
hotly contested election will likely encourage them to 
revert to less palatable, but tried and tested, tactics: 
they will need cash to run campaigns (and have 
limited scruples on its origins) and senior leaders may 
be more concerned about their personal prospects 
than principles of inclusion. The SPA’s distribution of 
interim legislature seats initially intended for 
independent civil society nominees shows how far 
there is still to go: all went to party members (mostly 
senior leaders and, in the case of NC, even to relatives 
of G.P. Koirala).147 
The hierarchical, patronage-based parties have done 
little to address social grievances, while past 
perceptions of corruption and incompetence boosted 
support for the palace and the Maoists as potentially 
more effective alternative rulers. The unrest in the 
Tarai that has been building since late 2006 is only 
one indication of the dangers invited by the political 
elite’s narrow base.148 At the same time, however, it 
offers more positive inspiration: in an election where 
many voters are disillusioned, and major parties may 
have few distinctive policies, reaching out to 
marginalised communities is one of the most 
promising strategies to win new voters. This has not 
been the parties’ forte – had they taken this route in 
the early 1990s, the Maoists might never have been 
able to take root – and even regional-based groups 
such as the NSP(A) have found themselves 
outflanked by more extreme rhetoric. But Tarai 
grievances are not unreasonable and key demands are 
all negotiable. This could yet be a useful wake-up call 
for party leaders. 
Internal democracy also needs attention. It is 
unrealistic to expect hierarchical parties to transform 
their organisational dynamics overnight but most 
parties would benefit from more transparent internal 
debate. The difficulties they are facing in reaching 
decisions on contentious issues would be reduced if 
there were productive discussion at all levels of the 
 
 
147 The parties split the 48 seats to benefit themselves rather 
than to provide wider representation, as the interim 
constitution demands. Apart from allowing the inclusion of 
the ULF, which was not represented in the 1999 parliament, 
these seats were meant to go to “people-based and 
professional organisations, class organisations and 
professional bodies, oppressed ethnic groups, backward 
regions, indigenous communities, women and various political 
personalities nominated through understanding”, interim 
constitution, Art. 45(c). The division was: ten seats each for 
the NC, UML and CPN(M); six for NC(D) and three each for 
NSP(A), NWPP, ULF and Janamorcha Nepal. 
148 See below. 
party. Deeper policy debates could also draw on 
outside expertise, as well as on the direct experience 
of the local party activists, who are most in touch with 
the public. 
Steps along these lines would start to address the 
corrosive influence of patronage. Within most parties, 
leaders with financial resources build personal 
followings, secure party offices and reward their 
followers with jobs and money-making opportunities. 
Potential leaders who are short of cash may find 
themselves unable to rise if less scrupulous rivals buy 
promotions.149 Transparency in debate and decision-
making, including on key constitutional questions, is 
one means to dilute patronage power and reduce its 
impact on policy choices. 
In the interval before the CA, the parties might also 
benefit from more inclusive internal debates on 
procedural and substantive constitutional matters. To 
articulate more meaningful constitutional agendas, 
they could draw on academics, lawyers, and 
journalists, who have been sidelined in the past. Both 
Congress and the UML, for example, have cadres 
who bring intellectual heft to bear on difficult 
political issues, although they have had little part in 
policy-making. As a former adviser to a senior NC 
leader explained, opportunities for their substantive 
input are ill-structured and often frustrated.150 Parties 
could introduce a system of “position papers” by 
academics and lawyers to present options on different 
constitutional issues. Creation of such opportunities is 
largely a question of intra-party initiative. Strengthening 
their intellectual and policy-making capacities is one 
way to professionalise parties and diminish patronage-
based politics. 
B. THE MAOISTS 
The Maoists have in successive agreements promised 
to join competitive multiparty politics.151 While the 
interim constitution has sidelined the monarchy and 
opened the door to a share in government, the CA 
elections will be the critical point for the leadership to 
justify its revised strategy to cadres. However much it 
insists its approach has changed, there will be an 
 
 
149 Crisis Group interview, Nepali political analyst, Lalitpur, 
October 2006. 
150 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
151 The most significant commitment was made in the 
November 2005 twelve-point agreement, Crisis Group Report, 
Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit.; it was reaffirmed in subsequent 
agreements, including the CPA and the interim constitution.  
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ingrained tendency to rely on long-standing tactics of 
intimidation and coercion. 
Nevertheless, the Maoists have potentially strong 
issues on which to campaign – their selection of 
representatives for the interim legislature indicates the 
ease with which they can present a more progressive 
public face than the mainstream parties. Despite 
opinion polling efforts, no one can confidently predict 
their share of the vote. Many non-Maoists will be 
hoping for a happy medium: high enough to lock 
them into the process and feel they have a stake in 
making it work but not enough to give them decisive 
influence. But the Maoist leadership will need to 
show some results if cadres are not to be alienated: 
the decision on the fate of the monarchy will be an 
early test. 
1. Views on constitutional substance and 
procedures 
The Maoists are in one respect victims of their own 
political success – the mainstream parties’ endorsement 
of their headline constitutional change agenda 
threatens to undermine their unique appeal. Maoist 
leaders, however, see the parties’ promises to address 
social exclusion as rhetoric, not real commitment (an 
interpretation for which mainstream party behaviour 
gives some evidence). Aggressive republicanism 
distinguishes them from their rivals, especially 
Congress.152 In the meantime they plan to use the 
interim legislature and continued street demonstrations 
as twin means to push their agenda.153 
According to Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai, the 
party expects to win a majority in CA elections but 
would remain in the assembly with a smaller share of 
the vote.154 A Maoist majority is implausible, even if 
not altogether impossible; more likely is a 
respectable, but less than decisive, share. One August-
September 2006 poll suggested they could secure 
about 15 per cent (against 25 per cent each for NC 
 
 
152 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist leaders and cadres, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. Some Congress-oriented 
commentators argue that since late 2005 Maoists publications 
have used the phrase “end of absolute monarchy,” rather than 
“abolition” of the monarchy, allowing for some compromise 
with NC’s ceremonial monarchy proposal. Krishna P. Khanal, 
“The Maoist Agenda of Restructuring the State: An 
Appraisal”, in Lok Raj Baral (ed.), Nepal: Faces of 
Insurgency (Delhi, 2006), p. 165. 
153 “Maobadile sadak ra sadanbata eksath awaj uthaune”, 
Janadesh, 30 January 2007. 
154 Crisis Group interview, Bhaktapur, October 2006. 
and UML);155 a subsequent September survey put the 
Maoists at 16 per cent, but ahead of all the other 
parties, a finding repeated in a January 2007 survey.156 
Still, the Maoists calculate they can build their 
electoral base by pointing to their consistently 
republican line, as well as by capitalising on 
discontent with the mainstream parties’ failure to 
address regional, ethnic group and caste differences.157 
Their yield of seats will also depend on the 
proportional system adopted; a multi-member system 
would compensate for their expected weakness in 
FPTP constituencies (but it appears that this option 
has been rejected; see above). 
Beyond their vigorous opposition to the monarchy, 
the Maoists have a broad agenda – although more 
detailed in some parts than others. Presenting themselves 
as the party of the previously disenfranchised, with 
“anti-feudal” policies, gives possible widespread 
appeal. According to a senior military commander, 
voters will have four reasons to be attracted to the 
Maoist platform – class, regional origin, gender or 
ethnicity. Through “scientific” land reform, select 
industrialisation and devolution of economic power to 
a local level, the Maoists claim they will be able to 
ameliorate the position of these previously excluded 
groups.158 By contrast, Bhattarai argues, the mainstream 
parties such as the NC and UML “represent the same 
class groups and the big capitalist groups” and not the 
general populace.159 Unsurprisingly, the Maoists have 
pushed for early land reform within the transitional 
process, even securing a commitment from the SPA 
to this in the CPA.160 A central concern of the Maoist 
 
 
155 “Nepal: A Cautiously Optimistic Public”, Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research, 17 September 2006, p. 13.  
156 Both the September 2006 and January 2007 polls were 
carried out by Interdisciplinary Analysts. Their findings are 
presented comparatively in “Nepal Contemporary Political 
Situation IV: Political Opinion Poll Top-Line Findings”, 
Interdisciplinary Analysts, 5 February 2007, Kathmandu. 
While the positions of all parties remained broadly similar in 
these two surveys, “don’t know/cannot say” responses 
increased from 15.5 to 27.3 per cent, suggesting that 
undecided voters may form a crucial swing constituency. 
157 The January 2007 merger of the independent Society for 
the Liberation of Dalit Castes Nepal (SLDCN) with the 
Maoists’ Nepal Dalit Liberation Front suggests the CPN(M) is 
actively pursuing strategies to tie in such support. “Dalit 
morchaharubich ekikaran”, Janadesh, 30 January 2007. The 
SLDCN’s Padmalal Bishwokarma was nominated by the 
Maoists as one of their ten non-party MLPs; Maoist central 
advisor Tilak Pariyar is now coordinator of the merged 
organisation. 
158 Crisis Group interview, member of Maoist negotiation 
team, October 2006. 
159 Crisis Group interview, Bhaktapur, 16 October 2006. 
160 CPA, para 11.  
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reform agenda is the army, which they insist must be 
completely restructured. They also call for 
punishment of individual officers responsible for war 
crimes.161 
2. Democratic reform 
The Maoists have much more to do to establish solid 
democratic credentials but the constitutional process 
may both encourage and hinder this. Their likely 
behaviour will be conditioned as much by shifting 
external dynamics as by their established political and 
organisational culture. Reformers within the 
movement may be boosted by successful participation 
in an interim government but the fact that this 
foothold in central power had to be gained at the cost 
of demanding that low-level cadres surrender local 
influence increases vertical tensions. Maoist leaders 
have shown they can adapt their tactics and reorient 
their strategy to make the most of the process. They 
probably remain Nepal’s most disciplined and 
effective political force but they are not immune to 
miscalculation, internal disputes and personality 
clashes. 
The start of real campaigning will force the Maoists 
to pay more attention to the support they currently 
have and the level of backing they can hope to build. 
This, too, may invite negative responses (such as 
resorting to intimidation or coercion), positive 
initiatives to win hearts and minds by demonstrating a 
reformed character and showcasing popular policies 
or – most likely – a combination of both. Interestingly, 
they have already rehabilitated some former leaders 
who had left the party or surrendered to the 
government.162 Leaders are well aware that certain 
behaviour, such as “tax” collection, is deeply unpopular; 
they have also acknowledged that they have made 
“mistakes” in the course of their insurgency and need 
to make amends.163 But they are wary of relinquishing 
forms of power that can still be used as bargaining 
chips, are worried about alienating cadres and 
calculate that some of the measures they were meant 
to relinquish (such as their “people’s courts”) may 
still boost their popularity. 
Although the Maoists have proved adept at public 
debate, they are not yet comfortable with some forms 
 
 
161 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, Bhaktapur, 16 
October 2006. 
162 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist cadres, Kathmandu, 
January 2007. 
163 The most notable such apology was made by Prachanda in 
his first official public appearance in Kathmandu, addressing a 
large crowd of supporters on 13 February 2007. 
of discussion. Leaders express ambivalence about 
independent public outreach efforts in terms that 
suggest they could try to obstruct them. According to 
Bhattarai, civil society-led public education is “not 
necessary”; funds “are better spent on the poor than 
on creating a new class that benefits from the 
constitution-making process”.164 Whatever the flaws 
of NGO public education efforts, however, neither the 
Maoists nor any other political party is entitled to 
block them. The CPA commits its signatories to 
respect the “fundamental rights of the Nepalese 
people to cast their votes in the CA polls without any 
kind of fear” – an expansive repudiation of coercion 
which includes respect for education, campaigning 
and debate in the run-up to the polls. However, the 
peace deal does not entirely eliminate Maoist capacity 
for armed violence: it does not mention their militia 
forces, and the arms management process is unlikely 
to be watertight. 
Still, the Maoists do not appear to have obstructed 
civil society efforts so far; nor have their violations of 
the CPA been as egregious as some reports imply. 
They have allowed re-establishment of hundreds of 
police posts and have been willing to compromise 
with the SPA and actively cooperate on certain 
matters. Most encouragingly for those Maoists who 
want to make a success of multiparty politics – and 
most discouragingly for those who hoped the mainstream 
parties would reform and reassert themselves – the 
SPA has left the Maoists considerable space in which 
to operate. Their selection of interim legislature 
members was a masterstroke, with their diverse 
contingent in stark contrast to the conspicuously 
unrepresentative delegations of the mainstream 
parties. The latter sacrificed a chance to win back 
ground by using their “civil society” nominations to 
give seats to their own inner circles. Only the Maoists 
nominated a range of non-party members, who they 
said, would be free of the party whip to vote with 
their conscience. Competitive politics may offer the 
Maoists significant openings to win real electoral 
support. 
C. THE RELUCTANT, THE RESISTANT AND 
THE REBELLIOUS 
Although no single spoiler is likely to be able to 
derail the constitutional process, a number of political 
groups and institutions are far from enthusiastic 
supporters. The palace is not ready to cooperate in its 
own dissolution; the army may not go on the 
 
 
164 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, Bhaktapur, 16 
October 2006. 
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offensive to rescue it but will resist major structural 
reform. Neither the interim constitution nor the CA 
will find it easy to displace entrenched institutional 
practices with new, untested rules. Unwritten 
conventions underwrite the palace’s maintenance of 
some influence, especially with the survival of the 
palace secretariat.165 Institutions such as the civil 
service have been a source of stability during periods 
of rapid change but may become barriers to reform. 
Violent groups (especially those in the Tarai) may 
make more active attempts to disrupt the process. 
They, in combination with weak response to 
grievances which could be addressed by negotiation, 
will present the most serious threat if they choose to 
oppose the polls and mobilise enough support to 
make parts of the country ungovernable – a tactic in 
which the Maoists have provided master classes. 
The palace. The palace has played no overt role in 
negotiating the constitutional transition, although it 
has not lost all its allies or means to exert some 
influence. In late 2006, the king started selective 
consultations about political developments but said he 
would maintain a “respectful silence”.166 Nevertheless, 
just days after his car was stoned when he visited 
Pashupatinath temple on the occasion of the 
Shivaratri festival, he risked another political venture 
by making a public address on Democracy Day.167 He 
attempted once again to justify the royal coup, 
arguing that “it is clear that the prevailing situation 
compelled us to take the 1 February 2005 step in 
accordance with the people’s aspirations…”.168 This 
renewed foray seems unlikely to boost the monarchy’s 
dwindling popularity. Gyanendra lost much of his 
personal influence by failing to deliver on the 
promises he made when he seized power.169 His 
 
 
165 For example, the NA performed a ceremonial salute for the 
king on the occasion of the Basanta panchami religious 
festival. Similarly, Chief of Army Staff Rookmangad Katwal 
had continued the traditional practice of paying respects to the 
king during the autumn Dasain festival. See Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. 
166 King Gyanendra has met former Prime Ministers Surya 
Bahadur Thapa, Kirtinidhi Bista and Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand and other royalist politicians such as Bishwabandhu 
Thapa, Pashupati Shamsher Rana and Rabindra Nath Sharma. 
“Ke gardaichha darbar”, Samay, 18 January 2007. 
167 The address was apparently not authorised by the 
government but was nevertheless broadcast on state-run 
media, prompting questions over who had approved or 
allowed it. 
168 King Gyanendra, Democracy Day address, 19 February 
2007. 
169 The King’s failure to capitalise on his February 2005 move 
was rapidly evident. See Crisis Group Asia Report No106, 
Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit., pp.25-26. 
relative restraint since April 2006 has not restored his 
image: surveys suggest that support for retaining the 
monarchy continues to shrink.170  
That the monarchy’s future will be decided in the CA 
and not by a referendum means royalists will not have 
a clearly defined moment around which to rally 
support.171 This may promote stability in the CA 
election process, where the monarchy will be only 
one of several prominent issues. Monarchists will 
have to mobilise as a political party, or through 
influencing other parties, rather than by direct appeal 
to the public.172 This may benefit the palace: 
manipulating a small number of CA delegates may be 
more promising than trying to persuade sceptical 
voters. 
The king’s fall from power and popularity does not 
automatically mean an end to the royal institution. 
Congress and the NC(D) may back a ceremonial role – 
or at least not rule it out – with an eye to winning 
support from those who still want some sort of 
monarchy.173 However, the public mood is making 
leaders rethink their position: a motion condemning 
the king’s Democracy Day address and demanding 
action against him was introduced into the interim 
legislature by the NC. Pro-palace forces still retain 
some stake in the political transition. Despite the 
exclusion of hardline royalists from the interim 
legislature, monarchists will have a voice in pre-
 
 
170 A September 2006 opinion poll suggested that 48 per cent 
of the population wanted to keep the monarchy - with support 
higher among women and older people, Greenberg Quinlan, 
op. cit., p. 52. However, four opinion polls conducted by 
Interdisciplinary Analysts suggest support for retention of the 
monarchy has been falling, from 80.6 per cent in December 
2004 to 44.9 per cent in January 2007, “Nepal Contemporary 
Political Situation IV”, op. cit. 
171 In 1980 the palace used a referendum to shore up the 
Panchayat system, then under attack from demonstrating 
students. Although the 1980 referendum ended in an 
endorsement of the Panchayat system (with a 54.8 per cent yes 
vote), the narrowness of the vote was viewed as a moral 
victory for democratic forces. Lok Raj Baral, Nepal’s Politics 
of Referendum: A Study of Groups, Personalities and Trends 
(Vikas Publishing House, 1983); R. Andrew Nickson, 
“Democratization and the Growth of Communism in Nepal”, 
in Deepak Thapa (ed.), Understanding the Maoist Movement 
of Nepal (Kathmandu, 2003), p. 7. 
172 A referendum would also have surfaced and emphasised 
deep-seated social differences just at the moment when 
Nepalis were seeking consensus on many of difficult political 
questions. Crisis Group interview, former NC advisor, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
173 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. 
cit., for an explanation of NC political calculations on the 
monarchy.  
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election debates and will presumably win some 
representation in the CA.174 This reduces their 
incentive to reject or disrupt the process but the 
electoral arithmetic is still far from favourable for 
them. 
The army. The Nepalese Army (NA) remains wary 
of the peace process and suspicious of both the 
Maoists and the mainstream parties. Nevertheless, it 
has been conspicuously well behaved in its involvement 
in the mechanics of the peace process. Senior officers 
have no desire to integrate large numbers of former 
Maoist fighters into a restructured national force and 
are happy to delay discussion of such changes. But 
day-to-day cooperation with Maoist commanders and 
the UN on the Joint Monitoring Coordination 
Committee (JMCC) has been positive and has helped 
the cantonment process move forward in a 
constructive atmosphere.175 The NA has little outlet 
for its conservative political instincts: it has been 
unable (perhaps unwilling) to prevent the monarchy’s 
marginalisation, while gradual moves to reduce its 
autonomy have not been dramatic enough to prompt 
resistance.176 
The NA successfully – and crudely – pressured the 
post-April government not to interfere in its chain of 
command but now faces internal political challenges. 
The then number two, Rookmangad Katwal, ensured 
his succession as chief of army staff but has 
discovered this is a mixed blessing. Viewed with 
suspicion by some as an outsider (he is not from a 
traditional officer clan) and by others as too fanatical 
a royalist, he must guide the army through a difficult 
 
 
174 In general, ethnic advocates for redivision of the country 
along ethnically defined lines approach the coming political 
transition as if past political elites, and in particular high-caste 
Bahuns and Chhetris, no longer have political power or a large 
stake in the political process. Crisis Group interviews, ethnic 
rights NGOs, Kathmandu, October 2006. This is a 
miscalculation. Advocates for greater equity in Nepal’s 
national political arrangements are more likely to achieve their 
goals if they can persuade still-powerful elites that this is in 
their interests. By presenting their grievances in zero-sum 
terms, ethnic activists undercut their political aspirations. 
175 Crisis Group interviews, JMCC members, Kathmandu 
December 2006 and January 2007. PRSG Ian Martin 
commented that “The JMCC is now meeting regularly, with 
excellent cooperation between the Nepal Army and PLA 
representatives, and between each of them and the United 
Nations”. Press Statement, 5 January 2007, OPRSG, 
Kathmandu. 
176 Some messages suggesting a distinct cooling of relations 
with the palace have been sent. For example, the king’s last 
principle military secretary, Major-General Gajendra Limbu, 
was quietly retired at the end of December 2006 when under 
normal circumstances his term would have been extended. 
transition. Despite a reshuffle of the higher ranks, 
some senior positions are still vacant and, with no 
three-star generals in country,177 Katwal looks slightly 
isolated at the top. Securing his own position, the 
army’s basic interests and its international reputation 
will probably leave little scope for active spoiling of 
the peace process unless the broader political 
landscape changes significantly. 
The judiciary. One potential vehicle for disruption of 
the constituent transition is the traditionally conservative 
supreme court.178 Three separate petitions filed there 
challenged the validity of the May 2006 House of 
Representatives proclamation stripping the King’s 
powers.179 These efforts raised the possibility, albeit 
remote, of a judicial order invalidating that 
proclamation and the subsequent endorsement by the 
House of the interim constitution. Supreme Court 
judges had already refused to swear new oaths of 
office on the basis of the May 2006 proclamation. 
Chief Justice Dilip Kumar Paudel’s eventual 
willingness to swear a new oath of office to the prime 
minister under the interim constitution suggests that a 
compromise has been reached.180 Supreme court 
judges had decided to call for amendment of the 
interim constitution’s judicial provisions but left it too 
late to submit a proposal.181 It may be that demoralisation 
reduces the court’s willingness to deliver verdicts 
against the executive. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction 
within the judiciary (and among lawyers of various 
 
 
177 The NA has two Lieutenant-General positions. One post 
was left vacant by Katwal’s promotion; the other is held by 
Lt.-Gen. Balananda Sharma, who is shortly to return to Nepal 
after a lengthy posting as a UN peacekeeping mission 
commander. Delay and confusion in army promotions and 
senior officer transfers has sparked discontent within the army 
and towards the government. “Senama rajnitikaran”, Saptahik 
Vimarsha, 2 February 2007. 
178 Among the Supreme Court decisions resented for their 
conservative tilt is the 1 June 1999 order that prohibited the 
use of local and regional language by local administrative 
bodies under the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999. 
Whelpton, A History, op. cit., p. 232. 
179 These were filed by lawyers Achyut Prasad Kharel, Shree 
Prasad Upadhyay, Amita Shrestha and Arun Subedi. 
180 Paudel only agreed to take a new the oath under the interim 
constitution three days after its promulgation. “Aaphaile 
shapath nalie pradhannyayadishlai”, Kantipur, 19 January 
2007. According to Interim Constitution Article 162(2) judges 
refusing to take new oaths will be dismissed. 
181 The interim constitution was promulgated one day after 
their decision to recommend changes. They had proposed 
changes to articles 103(1), 105(1) and (2), 106 (1) and (2), 
107(4), 109(4), 112, 113, 117, 149(2), 155(1) and 162(2). 
Madhav Dhungel, “Naitik sankatma nyayadhishharu”, Nepal, 
21 January 2007. 
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political persuasions) over the interim constitution’s 
concentration of executive power may lead to 
challenges to government authority. Conservative 
judges could be a convenient front for monarchists to 
pursue extra-parliamentary openings for preserving 
royal powers; they should also check government 
excesses. 
The bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has been a source 
of stability in a turbulent period – especially given its 
ability to work according to unwritten conventions 
amid legal and constitutional uncertainty. But this 
stability could also obstruct constitutional change. 
The civil service is highly unrepresentative,182 enjoys 
its centralised authority, is conservative in its day-to-
day behaviour and does not stand up to political 
leaders (be they the king or party politicians) when 
they violate the rules of government.183 
The interim period will strain the bureaucracy but also 
offer openings for gradual reform. Tasks such as 
distributing citizenship papers, re-establishing local 
governance and preparing for elections will stretch 
ministries and other departments to the limit; political 
parties – including, once they join the interim 
government, the Maoists – will probably seek to 
influence appointments and shape the way civil 
servants work within ministries under their control; 
external pressure to alter working practices (for 
example, from the international financial institutions) 
will be maintained. A civil service commission has 
already drawn up a ten-year plan.184 Even if this is 
implemented, more radical measures to make the 
bureaucracy representative and accountable may well 
be needed. 
Violent opposition. Organised protests and armed 
action in the Tarai since late 2006 have indicated the 
potential for violent opposition to the peace process. 
Two armed factions – Jay Krishna Goit and Jwala 
Singh’s branches of the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti 
Morcha (JTMM)185– have been trying to build a 
power base in the eastern Tarai; there are also eastern 
 
 
182 On representation in the civil service and elsewhere, see 
Fatik Bahadur Thapa, “Report on involvement of indigenous 
nationalities in the state mechanism”, Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
183 See “Employees intensify stir”, Kathmandu Post, 11 April 
2006 and Crisis Group Report, From People Power to 
Peace?, op. cit. 
184 “Mid-term report on civil service’s 10-year vision paper 
submitted”, nepalnews.com, 3 December 2006. 
185 Goit formed the JTMM on 16 January 2005, just after his 
dismissal as chairman of the Maoist-affiliated Madheshi 
Rastriya Mukti Morcha. Jwala Singh (Nagendra Paswan) led a 
split in 2006, forming his own faction. 
hill-based groups such as the Kirat Workers’ Party 
that claim an independent armed capacity. However, 
none of these groups is yet significant in a purely 
military sense; the leverage they have is a widespread 
feeling that the interim constitution does not address 
major grievances, and the mainstream parties will not 
provide an outlet for demands. Even the Maoist-
affiliated Kirant Rastriya Morcha has expressed 
dissatisfaction over its own party’s ethnic policy.186 
Such discontent, exacerbated by inadequate public 
consultation, has allowed more radical fronts such as 
the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum187 to gain sudden 
prominence and has left space for opportunistic 
meddling, be it by royalists, religious activists or 
cross-border criminals.188 
The spike in violence in the Tarai showed how easy it 
is to undermine fragile governance and policing. 
Repeated curfews and police shootings did little to 
restore order; the latter, as during the Maoist conflict, 
only added fuel to the fire. Activists’ demands are 
negotiable and the violence may force the government 
and Maoists to engage in substantive talks.189 
However, the rapid spread and scale of unrest is a 
stark warning that determined opposition and political 




186 Om Aastha Rai, “Sashankit”, Samaya, 1 February 2007. 
187 Known in Nepali as the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum; the 
English-language press has (confusingly) used the acronyms 
MPRF and MJF interchangeably but they refer to the same 
organisation. MPRF Chairman Upendra Yadav is a former 
UML parliamentary candidate who joined the Maoists before 
leaving the party in 2004. 
188 On the accusation that royalists were responsible for 
instigating trouble in the Tarai, see “Late-night crackdown on 
royalists”, Himalayan Times, 30 January 2007 and “Nepalese 
former minister arrested”, BBC News, 30 January 2007. 
189 The primary demands are for a proportional representation 
system for the constituent assembly elections, a federal state 
structure and citizenship rights for Madhesis.  
190 Ian Martin warned that “The role of my Office is to support 
a free and fair Constituent Assembly process, and the efforts 
we are supporting to make this possible on the agreed 
schedule can only be jeopardised if the situation in the Terai 
continues or escalates”, press statement, OPRSG, 26 January 
2007, Kathmandu. Chief Election Commissioner Bhoj Raj 
Pokhrel similarly cautioned that such unrest threatens the 
election timetable, “Terai unrest may delay CA polls: CEC 
Pokhrel”, nepalnews.com, 27 January 2007. 
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VI. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
The constitutional transition requires a consensus 
among key political actors but public involvement is 
also vital.191 The 1990 Constitution came to be 
regarded as illegitimate in part because it was not 
seen to derive from a public consultative process. 
Legitimacy, and hence stability, typically flow from 
the perception of public involvement in a constitution’s 
preparation.192 A visibly public drafting process 
would make the new constitution a more stable 
framework for resolving future political disputes. 
There is in any case little prospect of suppressing 
social fault-lines (for instance, of ethnic and religious 
identity) via a top-down process. One consequence of 
the Maoist insurgency is that Nepal can no longer 
avoid discussing long-standing inequities. Constitution 
making cannot be solely an elite affair.193 
Discontent about exclusion has procedural as well as 
substantive facets. The public scepticism that resulted 
from the absence of a visibly participatory drafting 
process has been a major factor in the collapse of 
Nepal’s five past constitutions. Diverse and 
overlapping NGO projects to “educate” the public and 
gather views have already begun. Public participation 
in constitution making, however, needs more than 
public input. It also needs an institutional mechanism 
to collate, process and inject views into elite decision-
making processes. There is no such mechanism, and 
 
 
191 A study of several constitution-making processes by 
UNDP and the U.S. Institute for Peace concluded that “those 
cases in which the entire constitution-making process 
remained secretive and closed have permitted deal making 
among elites but have not typically produced either the most 
vibrant of constitutional democracies or the most stable 
governments over the long term”. Quoted in Jane Stromseth, 
David Wippman and Rosa Brooks, Can Might Make Rights: 
Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions (New 
York, 2006), p. 95. 
192 A comparative study of twelve constitutional-making 
processes concluded “Constitutions that were representative or 
involved a process of consultation and participation were 
perceived as more legitimate and hence received greater 
public support”. Kirsti Samuels, “Constitutional Drafting 
Processes and Democratization: A Discussion of Twelve Case 
Studies”, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, p. 5; see also Vivien Hart, United States Institute 
of Peace (USIP), “Democratic Constitution Making” USIP 
Special Report, no. 107, July 2003, pp. 4-7.  
193 The alternative would be analogous to 1990: elite 
consensus twinned with popular dissatisfaction. In other 
contexts, this has proved a volatile mix. Kirsti Samuels, “Post-
Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making”, Chicago 
Journal of International Law, vol. 6, 2005-2006, p. 670. 
neither the CPA nor the interim constitution proposed 
one. Without an intermediary institution such as a 
constitutional commission, public participation will 
likely be token, and public confidence in the resulting 
settlement will suffer. This role could be played by 
the proposed CA secretariat, if suitably empowered 
and staffed, or by an independent body along the lines 
of a constitutional commission. 
A. EDUCATION, DISSEMINATION AND 
DISCUSSION 
Public education has been led by the media and also 
backed by NGO efforts. As elections draw closer, 
however, party campaigning and government 
outreach efforts will be increasingly important. In 
addition, other non-governmental entities such as 
trade unions, professional associations, religious 
organisations and regional, ethnic and other single-
issue pressure groups are mobilising for particular 
constitutional changes. 
Public debate on the constitution will be decentralised 
and uncoordinated – natural in a healthy democracy. 
But public education efforts raise two more serious 
concerns. First, they are predicated on the assumption 
that citizens’ participation in constitution making will 
go beyond merely voting for CA delegates. As 
discussed above, institutional avenues for meaningful 
involvement do not yet exist. Secondly, many public 
education initiatives are grounded in a 
“consciousness-raising” model which assumes that 
knowledge flows down from civil society opinion-
formers to the “grassroots”.194 This may simply 
reinforce elite agendas – especially in the case of 
single-issue advocacy groups. Information about the 
constitution-making process certainly needs wide 
dissemination195 but public involvement should not be 
top-down. Nepalis who are not part of political elites 
(including civil society leaders) should be able to 
articulate interests and goals which are not well 
reflected in the political establishment. 
Ethnic and linguistic differences in public education 
also merit careful attention. While ethnicity may not 
be the most significant of Nepal’s social fault lines, it 
receives disproportionate attention. Ethnic groups are 
 
 
194 Crisis Group interview, political scientist, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. 
195 One poll found that only 35 per cent of Nepalis had heard 
only “a little” or “not heard” about the constituent assembly, 
with 61 per cent having heard “some” or “a lot” about the 
assembly. Only 1 per cent of those polled, however, expressed 
any disapproval of the idea. Greenberg Quinlan, op. cit., p. 10. 
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more coordinated than, for example, the decentralised 
community of Kathmandu-based dalit advocacy 
groups.196 Yet dalits tend to be among the poorest 
citizens and face discrimination even from members 
of ethnic groups.197 Self-designated ethnic civil 
society leaders, moreover, do not necessarily reflect 
fully or accurately the views of the rural communities 
for which they purport to speak;198 in particular, 
cultural and linguistic issues raised by civil society 
elites may only imperfectly reflect needs of a broader 
rural community. 
NGOs are potentially important for disseminating 
information about the constitution and have been 
effective in some areas. However, they are likely to 
be overshadowed by political party efforts – despite 
their weaknesses, the parties still have nationwide 
networks and are not necessarily seen as any more 
corrupt and self-serving than many NGOs. The major 
vehicle for debate and information dissemination will 
be the media. Protecting its freedoms will be 
important: threats to journalists could compromise 
wide discussion.199 The interim constitution 
guarantees press freedom but includes restrictive 
provisions which could be very broadly interpreted.200 
Federation of Nepalese Journalists President Bishnu 
 
 
196 Crisis Group interview, dalit NGO leader, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. Ethnic groups’ exclusion from political posts 
varies widely. See Krishna Hachhethu, “The Question of 
Inclusion and Exclusion in Nepal: Interface Between State and 
Ethnicity”, conference paper presented at “The Agenda of 
Transformation: Inclusion in Nepali Democracy”, Social 
Science Baha, 24-26 April 2003, Kathmandu. 
197 Hari Prasad Bhattarai, “Cultural Diversity and Pluralism in 
Nepal: Emerging Issues and the Search for a New Paradigm”, 
Contributions to Nepalese Studies, vol. 21, no. 2, July 2004, p. 
309.  
198 In particular, the umbrella organisation NEFIN does not 
represent every ethnic group (and has made decisions on 
defining which populations deserve separate classification – 
currently a total of 59 groups) nor does it necessarily reflect 
political formations within communities. Crisis group 
interviews, Nepali political analysts, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
199 On concerns related to Tarai violence see “CPJ calls for 
probe into attacks on journalists in Nepalgunj”, Committee to 
Protect Journalists, New York, 3 January 2007, at 
http://www.cpj.org/news/2007/asia/nepal03jan07na.html and 
“FNJ concerned over continued attack against media”, 
nepalnews.com, 30 January 2007. 
200 The government can restrict “any act which may 
undermine the sovereignty or integrity of Nepal, or which may 
jeopardise the harmonious relations subsisting among the 
peoples of various castes, tribes or communities; or on any act 
of sedition, defamation, contempt of court or incitement to an 
offence; or on any act which may be contrary to decent public 
behaviour or morality”. Art. 15(1). This may contravene 
ICCPR Art. 19(3). 
Nisthuri has warned that the SPA and Maoists have 
not created a genuinely free media environment.201 
Still, the quantity and quality of debate is 
encouraging. Apart from news reporting and detailed 
opinion pieces in the established press, a number of 
initiatives to make the most of radio networks are 
expanding the scope.202 
B. INCLUSIVENESS 
Overcentralisation of the state and resulting inequities 
in resource distribution and political power (often 
following caste, ethnic and geographic lines) helped 
the Maoists to recruit support, but their mobilisation 
around these issues has raised expectations and 
radicalised activists. Constitution making must permit 
the articulation of identity-based grievances while 
preventing ethnic, linguistic or cultural polarisation. 
Recognising this, the CPA signatories vowed to end 
all forms of discrimination.203 However, constitutional 
change alone cannot achieve such a dramatic 
transformation. The SPA and the Maoists will have to 
manage expectations more realistically while finding 
creative, equitable solutions to social and political 
conflicts that the party governments of the 1990s did 
not resolve. 
The interim constitution removes the 1990 document’s 
limitation on ethnically-defined parties, albeit in 
vague terms that leave open the possibility of new 
restraints.204 Nevertheless, there is little indication that 
 
 
201 “FNJ marks ‘black day’“, nepalnews.com, 2 February 
2007. 
202 For example, a daily discussion program produced by 
Antenna Foundation uses two-way satellite links to enable 
nationwide phone-in debates with invited guests. By offering 
freephone access in different regions of the country this has 
encouraged a broad cross-section of people to participate, 
bridging technical and financial constraints. 
203 It promised an end to “discriminations based on class, 
ethnicity, lingual [sic], gender, cultural, religion and region 
and to deconstruct the centralised and unitary structure of the 
state and to reconstruct it into an inclusive, democratic and 
forward-looking state”. CPA, Art. 10.1. 
204 The interim constitution prohibits restrictions on political 
parties (Art. 141(1)) but bars parties with “objectives contrary 
to the spirit and norms of the preamble of this constitution” 
(Art. 141(3)). It also bars the registration of “any political 
party if any Nepali citizen is discriminated against becoming a 
member of the political party on the basis of religion, caste, 
tribe, language or sex or if the name, objectives, insignia or 
flag of such political parties is of a nature that it would disturb 
the religious or communal harmony or of the nature to divide 
the country, or such party constitution or rules are for purposes 
of protecting and promoting a party-less or single party system 
of governance” (142(4)). This echoes Article 112 (2) and (3) 
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new parties organised on ethnic lines will be able to 
build sufficient presence to translate into meaningful 
CA representation.205 Mainstream parties will 
therefore remain vehicles for marginalised groups, but 
they must overcome histories of discrimination and 
neglect if they are to compete effectively with the 
Maoists for minority votes. Strengthening internal 
democracy would provide greater opportunities for 
ethnic minorities, women, and dalits in policy-
making. However, few party leaders expressed interest 
in such internal reform. 
In attempting to deal with long-ignored inequalities, 
Nepal risks transforming ethnic divisions into new 
causes of conflict. The Maoists, for example, have 
raised perhaps unrealistic hopes by promising “self-
determination” for some (but not all) geographically 
concentrated ethnic groups.206 The mainstream parties 
are unlikely to have the credibility to address these 
exclusions if they remain dominated by a limited set 
of ethnic groups and castes. 
One NC central committee member argued that 
inclusiveness could be addressed by altering the 
party’s constitution to include a specific reference to 
the importance of “inclusive democracy”.207 Mainstream 
                                                                                        
of the 1990 Constitution, which prohibited any party with an 
ideology that was “inconsistent with [the] Constitution” and 
parties formed “on the basis of religion, community, caste, 
tribe or region”; these provisions were used to prevent the 
registration of ethnic and region-based parties. 
205 One leader of an ethnic federation has mooted formation of 
a political party but this idea has yet to develop. Crisis Group 
interviews, Nepali political analysts, Kathmandu, October 
2006. Ethnic and regional parties, including the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party, have fared poorly in past elections, a 
pattern that is unlikely to change. However, the Tarai protests 
focused renewed attention on regional issues and may well 
lead to the creation of new parties. In 1991 the Nepal Rastriya 
Janamukti Party campaigned for ethnic quotas within the 
political and administrative system: The largest share of the 
vote it received in any constituency was 14 per cent. In 1994, 
it failed to break the 3 per cent threshold required for 
recognition as a national party. John Whelpton, “Political 
Identity in Nepal: State, Nation, and Community”, in Gellner, 
et al., Nationalism and Ethnicity, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
206 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, Bhaktapur, 
October 2006, Maoist leaders are now careful to avoid talk of 
“self-determination” that might suggest a right to secede. 
Backing off from the Maoists’ initial proposal of nine 
ethnically defined federal units, Bhattarai suggested that there 
should be “roughly” nine to eleven provinces, that self-
determination applies in “principle” but not in “practice”, and 
that linguistic and territorial divisions also matter. This 
suggests the Maoists have realised the risk in their earlier 
rhetoric. 
207 Crisis Group interview, NC central committee member, 
Kathmandu, 18 October 2006. 
party failure over a decade of democratic rule to 
ameliorate social divisions, however, means that 
promises alone are unlikely to be sufficient. Opening 
party hierarchies to more ethnic minorities, dalits, and 
women would be one way to make a concrete start.208 
The interim constitution takes a step in the right 
direction by requiring that party executive committees 
have “an inclusive system…for the inclusion of 
women, [and] Dalits including the members from 
neglected and suppressed regions”.209 It does not 
define what an “inclusive system” would be but one 
example is provided by the NC(D), whose January 
2006 convention ruled that eight of eighteen central 
committee seats must be allocated to women and 
previously marginalised minorities.210 Progress is not 
guaranteed: other parties have yet to follow, and the 
NC(D)’s innovation may be lost if it reunites with 
NC. Still, the interim constitution’s provision may 
stimulate internal debate if parties feel pressured to 
live up to it. Cross-party caucuses to push for 
inclusion measures may also gain in influence, 
building on the precedent of the cross-party women’s 
group that played an important role on the ICDC’s 
composition. 
C. FROM CONSULTATION TO 
PARTICIPATION 
Public involvement means more than just 
consultation. It entails public spaces and institutions 
through which members of the public can engage, and 
be seen to engage, with political elites. It is not 
sufficient to allow a say but then not to reflect views 
in the final document. Indeed, allowing the public to 
voice opinions and then failing to heed them would 
undermine the resulting constitution’s legitimacy. 
There is a need for mechanisms to incorporate the 
public contribution into the constitutional fabric. 
The ICDC learned that it is easier to gather views than 
to process them. Its experience suggests the need for a 
separate, professionally-staffed body to manage the 
technical side of the constitution-making process. A 
possible candidate for this role has been identified by 
the interim constitution, which calls for a “Secretariat 
of the Constituent Assembly”, tasked with managing 
 
 
208 Dalit activists, for example, stress the difficulty that dalit 
candidates have in winning national elections and also 
obtaining positions within political parties – including the 
CPN(M). Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu October 2006. 
209 Interim constitution, Art. 142(3)(c). 
210 Crisis Group interview, NC(D) central committee member, 
Kathmandu, October 2006. 
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“the work” of the assembly (responsibilities to be 
determined by a subsequent law).211 Another option 
would be to have a more aggressively conceived 
“constitutional commission”.212 
Whether a secretariat or a commission, the body’s 
tasks would likely include drafting options for 
constitutional provisions (and explaining the implications 
of each); encouraging public submissions (by 
facilitating public education and outreach); processing 
public submissions and ensuring they are considered; 
and handling public communications about the 
process (to keep expectations realistic). To complete 
these tasks successfully means starting before the CA 
is formed: apart from technical drafting, most are 
important for the pre-election period. 
D. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Bureaucratic lethargy is a danger with any 
government body, and a new institution risks 
emasculation by patronage appointments – the fate, 
for example, of the Peace Secretariat.213 Nevertheless 
there are models of constitutional commissions that 
the interim government might study. Experience from 
other nations suggests that planning and budgeting for 
effective public participation should begin as early as 
possible. The Kenyan constitutional commission, 
established in 2000, prepared and held educational 
meetings in every district in the country, collected 
36,000 submissions and processed them into a 
manageable form for the constitutional convention 
held in 2003-2004.214  
Other relatively impoverished nations have also 
concluded that extensive public participation in 
constitution making is worth the financial cost. In 
April 1994, Eritrea initiated a two-year constitution-
 
 
211 Interim constitution, Art. 80. 
212 This recommendation has already been made to the SPA 
and the Maoists in strong terms by a UNDP-sponsored 
constitutional adviser. Crisis Group interview, Professor Yash 
Ghai, Lalitpur, October 2006. 
213 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. The Peace Secretariat was established in 2004 
to support the government’s efforts to seek a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. It was only minimally effective and 
was sidelined under the post-February 2005 royal 
administration. 
214 Crisis Group interview, Yash Ghai, Kathmandu, October 
2006; Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, “Constitutional Ability, 
Inclusion, Participation, Discipline”, Nepali Times, 27 October 
2006. See also Jill Cottrell and Yash Ghai, “Constitution 
Making and Democratisation in Kenya (2000-2005)”, 
Democratisation 14:1 (2007) pp. 1-25. 
making process that involved “literally thousands of 
meetings and seminars” and a broad variety of 
educational tools “from comic books to musical 
plays, radio broadcasts to secondary school essay 
contests”. At one stage, 147,000 citizens debated 
constitutional proposals in 157 locations in the 
country, while another 11,000 participated in debates 
in sixteen overseas sites. The process was budgeted at 
$4.3 million;215 the resulting constitution, adopted in 
1997, was considered to have “a large measure of 
legitimacy”.216 Writing in 1998, the chair of the 
constitutional commission argued that broad public 
consultation had not only entrenched the constitution 
as a legitimate political institution, but had also 
deepened popular involvement in democratic processes, 
as the public’s “initial diffidence…gradually gave 
way to more vigorous and candid involvement” in 
constitution making.217 
Benefits from public education processes are 
uncertain and rarely take immediate, tangible form. 
Public consultation, however thorough, will not 
necessarily overcome elite political resistance. The 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, for 
example, identified popular concerns (such as housing) 
that nevertheless did not make it into the final 
document because politicians stymied their adoption.218 
And misconceived initiatives can be counterproductive. 
During Rwanda’s 2002 constitution-making exercise, 
educational efforts were generally construed as 
“instructions from the state” and did not add to the 
legitimacy of the process.219 In Afghanistan, a 
national consultation process in June and July 2003 
produced no perceptible changes in the draft 
constitution – indeed, it transparently prioritised the 
 
 
215 Richard A. Rosen, “Constitutional Process, 
Constitutionalism, and the Eritrean Experience”, North 
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation, Winter 1999, pp. 285-99. Eritrea in 1994 did not 
have political competition like Nepal’s today, but did contain 
dangerous ethnic and religious divisions. 
216 Göte Hanssen, “Building New States: Lessons From 
Eritrea” United Nations University Discussion Paper 2001/66, 
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/ 
dp2001-66.pdf.  
217 Bereket Habte Selassie, “Building a New Constitution for 
Eritrea”, Journal of Democracy, vol. 9, 1998, p. 173. Selassie 
is a highly respected professor of African studies at the 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, not a political 
figure. 
218 Crisis Group interview ,Yash Ghai, Kathmandu, October 
2006; Yash Ghai, Reviewing the Constitution: A Guide to the 
Kenyan Constitution (Nairobi, 2002), pp. 12, 16-17, 24. 
219 Crisis Group Africa Report No. 53, Rwanda At The End Of 
The Transition: A Necessary Political LIberalization 13 
November 2002, pp. 6-7. 
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input and interests of the incumbent government,220 
resulting in a constitution that centralised power in the 
hands of the president and his allies.221 
International practices thus do not offer Nepal an 
infallible model. But the precedents are worth 
studying, especially when they appear to fit with the 
country’s own experiences.  
 
 
220 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°29, Afghanistan: The 
Constitutional Loya Jirga, 12 December 2003. 
221 Stromseth et al, op. cit., p. 97. 
VII. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
Constitution making is, and must remain, nationally 
owned. Nevertheless, internationals can further the 
goal of an inclusive process in several ways. Beyond 
diplomatic pressure on the pivotal political actors, 
they can provide important assistance not only for 
education and dialogue on issues, but also for the 
electoral commission and election monitoring, human 
rights and ceasefire monitoring, and the as yet 
undefined “civil affairs” component of the UN 
mission. 
A. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICALITIES 
Nepal’s rich history of debate on constitutional and 
political issues means that it does not require foreign 
hand-holders. Technical assistance that assumes the 
portability of constitutional models from one context 
to another is inherently suspect, however easy it 
might be to assume that the country’s size and 
geography suggest parallels. Any efforts by donors to 
promote parochial models would in any case likely 
receive a cool welcome.222 
Nepalis have formulated and driven forward their 
roadmap for constitutional change. This national 
ownership enhances the prospects for success but 
does not exclude an international role. External 
players can pressure all sides to follow clearly 
recognised democratic rules and can support 
monitoring to ensure that the elections are free and 
fair. Technical assistance should help cultivate Nepali 
intermediaries – part of “civil society”223 – who can 
develop and disseminate ideas about both 
constitutional process and substance. 
Numerous Nepali academics associated with 
Tribhuvan University and private foundations have 
studied and commented on electoral and structural 
options in constitution making.224 The forthcoming 
 
 
222 In fact, determining when an institutional design feature 
from one context will be successful in another context is 
extremely difficult. See Mark Tushnet, “Returning with 
Interest: Observations on the Putative Benefit of Studying 
Comparative Constitutional Law”, University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 1, Fall 1998, p. 325. 
223 “Civil society”, a problematic term with many possible 
significations, is loosely used here in the basic sense of non-
governmental and non-political structures and networks such 
as academia, the press, non-governmental organisations, 
community associations and the like. 
224 Recent books on the constitutional process by Nepali 
experts include Bhimarjun Acharya, Making Constitution 
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International IDEA compilation of Nepali 
perspectives on constitutional options illustrates the 
breadth and richness of national debate and should 
help develop it further. Kathmandu-based institutions 
such as the Social Science Baha and the Martin 
Chautari provide forums for public discussion and 
publish useful resources.225 Nepal also has a wide 
range of both Nepali- and English-language periodicals. 
Its relatively vibrant media provides vehicles for 
disseminating Kathmandu debates to the broader 
country. In particular, radio and weeklies such as 
Himal Khabarpatrik, Nepal, and Samay reach a broad 
national audience. 
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Progress in the peace process has improved 
international unity. While some powerful players 
retain differing perspectives in private, all were quick 
to welcome the promulgation of the interim 
constitution and congratulate political leaders on the 
formation of the interim legislature. India is, as 
always, the dominant outside force. It was 
instrumental in shaping the framework for the peace 
process and is engaged in almost every aspect of 
Nepal’s politics. It is comfortable with a CA – the 
same mechanism it used to draft its own constitution 
between 1947 and 1950.226 Beyond the purely 
political, its major long-term concern is to build 
closer economic links that tie Nepal into its own 
economic progress. This will raise nationalist hackles 
if it means more Indian capital holding sway but 
offers one of the best means of reducing the 
likelihood of future conflict – provided the fruits of 
economic development are fairly shared, something 
that India has yet to achieve domestically. 
The U.S. is still in the painful process of readjusting 
its analysis and policy following the success of the 
April movement and Nepal’s resounding rejection of 
Washington’s long-standing contention that party-
                                                                                        
Through Constituent Assembly (Kathmandu, 2006); Birendra 
Prasad Mishra, Taranath Dahal, Bholanath Dhungana, Sanjiv 
Ghimire, Samvidhansabhako samrachana ra nirvachan 
paddhati (Kathmandu, 2006); and Taranath Dahal (ed.), 
Samaveshi loktantra (Kathmandu, 2006). 
225 For example, the Social Science Baha is publishing 
“concept briefs” in Nepali on about 30 key concepts and 
terms. Each between two and four pages, 100,000 copies will 
be printed and distributed to all village development 
committees, as well as being disseminated in the media and 
being the subject of discussion groups. 
226 The 1990 Constitution was influenced by both its Indian 
and British counterparts; Indian precedents are frequently 
cited in supreme court arguments and judgements. 
palace unity against the Maoists was the only way 
forward. The U.S. still formally lists the CPN(M) as a 
terrorist organisation and had warned that it will 
freeze aid to any ministries controlled by Maoists 
after the formation of the interim government. Even 
the establishment of the interim legislature prompted 
the suspension of a significant project on rule of law 
and respect for human rights.227 However, the U.S. 
Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets 
Control subsequently granted a license allowing the 
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to continue providing assistance 
even if Maoists join the government.228 Other 
international players, most notably China,229 are less 
constrained by rigid positions. Most donors have 
publicly supported the peace process, but have done 
little to ensure coordination of assistance. 
C. THE UN MISSION 
On 23 January 2007 the Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1740, establishing a 
UN political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) led by a 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The 
mission’s twelve-month mandate reflects the original 
request of the SPA and Maoists230 and the 
recommendations of the UN’s December 2006 
Technical Assessment Mission.231 Its five specific 
tasks cover three areas: monitoring the management 
of arms and armed personnel and assisting the parties 
to implement their agreement; assisting in monitoring 
ceasefire arrangements; and providing technical 
support for the planning, preparation and conduct of 
CA elections, reviewing all technical aspects of the 
 
 
227 “No trust”, Newsfront, 29 January 2007. In fact, the rules 
on dealing with terrorist organisations can be worked around. 
This has happened, for example, to a limited degree in 
Lebanon, where Hizbollah, also listed by the U.S. as a terrorist 
organisation, is part (albeit an uneasy one) of a government 
with which Washington maintains close relations. Crisis 
Group interview, retired U.S. diplomat, January 2007. 
228 “OFAC license ensures continued U.S. aid to Government 
of Nepal”, U.S. embassy press release, Kathmandu, 7 
February 2007. 
229 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. on 
China’s willingness to deal with the Maoists after April 2006. 
230 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. 
231 The UN’s Technical Assessment Mission, led by Personal 
Representative of the Secretary-General Ian Martin, visited 
Nepal in December 2006. See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s 
Peace Agreement, op. cit. The Secretary-General submitted 
his report to the Security Council on 9 January 2007. “Report 
of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United 
Nations assistance in support of its peace process”, UN 
Security Council, S/2007/7. 
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electoral process and reporting on the conduct of the 
election.232 
The UN has already played a crucial role in 
overseeing the initial registration of Maoist weapons 
and fighters, as well as chairing the Joint Monitoring 
Coordination Committee, which brings together 
Maoist and state military representatives to manage 
the process. The establishment of a full, Security 
Council-mandated mission confirms the UN’s 
engagement, gives it the capacity to fulfil the tasks 
requested of it and places it firmly at the centre of 
international assistance in specific areas. This makes 
coordination more feasible and should encourage 
political consensus on the overall direction of the 
process. The Secretary-General’s report to the Security 
Council also placed great stress on the need for an 
inclusive process, concluding with foresight that: 
The significant political process that Nepal has 
set in motion represents a crucial opportunity 
for the country to reshape its structures and 
institutions to reflect the capacities and meet 
the aspirations of all its peoples. The greatest 
challenge in the months ahead may be to ensure 
that Nepal’s remarkable diversity becomes an 
abiding strength rather than a source of 
division.233 
UNMIN does not have any specific mandate to assist 
the constitution-making process and the UN more 
generally has no formal role in this area. However, 
the UNDP has set up a constitution advisory support 
unit (CASU), in part at the request of the diplomatic 
community, to provide input. CASU and UNMIN 
work closely where possible and brief each other on 
relevant developments. CASU has established working 
relations with political parties, public and parliamentary 




232 The full text of UN Security Council Resolution 1740 is in 
Appendix B. 
233 “Report of the Secretary-General”, op. cit., p.16. PRSG Ian 
Martin underlined this stress on inclusiveness in a press 
statement warning that the Tarai unrest could threaten the 
peace process. Press Statement, 26 January 2007, UNMIN. 
234 CASU’s activities have included consultations with 
political parties and the Peace Secretariat on the peace 
settlement and the interim constitution; commentaries on the 
draft peace accord and the draft interim constitution; 
preparation of materials for use in civic education; and 
establishment of translation services and facilitation of 
workshops and conferences. Projected activities include 
training workshops on constitution making for parties and 
induction courses for CA members. 
D. AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT 
Areas where international aid to the constitutional 
process is already deployed, or could usefully be 
developed, include: 
Election assistance. UNMIN’s mandate gives the UN 
a central role in technical assistance and electoral 
monitoring, but other donors have also pledged help. 
India has offered advice and practical aid; its deputy 
chief election commissioner and other senior officials 
have visited to advise counterparts, and it is planning 
further training and material support.235 The Japanese 
government has donated computer equipment, ballot 
boxes and training;236 the European Commission is 
keen to help and sent an election observation 
exploratory mission to discuss how.237 Independent 
organisations, most notably the U.S.-based Carter 
Center (which has already established a country 
office), will boost the international monitoring 
capacity.238 India, while wary of external political 
intervention, enthusiastically backs a large monitoring 
presence. “We’d like to see the country crawling with 
observers”, said a senior diplomat. “There has to be 
national monitoring too but an international presence 
will do much more to reassure voters”.239 
Rule of law and human rights. Functioning law and 
order and institutionalised protection of human rights 
are essential components of a secure electoral 
environment. Some states were quick to develop 
military aid strategies for counter-insurgency but all 
have struggled to find the right way to assist civilian 
policing in the transitional period. “The Nepal Police 
and Armed Police Force have long wish-lists for 
equipment”, an ambassador said, “but even if we 
supply everything they want, that won’t necessarily 
boost their low morale or translate their nationwide 
presence into a feeling of public security”.240 
The interim constitution suggests that citizens’ rights 
are not in the forefront of politicians’ thinking: 
 
 
235 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
236 “Japan to assist in CA elections, arms monitoring”, 
ekantipur.com, 24 January 2007. 
237 The 7-15 February mission was to assess the advisability, 
usefulness and feasibility of deploying a long term EU 
Election Observation Mission for the constituent assembly 
elections. European Commission email communication with 
Crisis Group, January 2007. 
238 Crisis Group interviews, Carter Center officials, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
239 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, 
Kathmandu, January 2007. 
240 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, January 2007. 
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empowering the interim cabinet with an unrestricted 
right to grant pardons seems to pre-empt public 
debate on transitional justice, for example.241 The 
balancing of peace and justice priorities, for example 
with respect to the treatment of human rights abuses 
committed by both sides during the civil conflict, is 
inherently sensitive and should be left to a national 
decision-making process. But the international 
community can justifiably press all parties to abide by 
international standards (for example, by ensuring that 
the National Human Rights Commission appointment 
procedure meets the Paris Principles standard)242 and 
live up to the CPA commitments, as well as insist, as 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) did forcefully during a January 2007 visit, 
that rights issues not be swept aside by political elites 
for their own convenience.243 UNMIN has 
responsibilities in this area (as well as providing 
police advisers);244 OHCHR will continue to play a 
parallel role but also has to renegotiate its mandate 
with the government. 
Voter education. Donors have already committed 
significant sums to aid public outreach. UK, Swiss, 
and Australian aid agencies, for example, are using a 
multi-year multi-million dollar Rights, Democracy 
and Inclusion Fund to support public education; the 
Canadian Cooperation Office has allocated $1.2 
million for the same purpose.245 These funds are 
focused on “grassroots” education. As some donor 
agencies acknowledge, gauging the success of such 
efforts is difficult.246 Maoist concerns that they risk 
 
 
241 It may be that the pardon provision, like many other 
articles, was an unthinking replication of the 1990 
Constitution rather than a deliberate initiative. 
242 See “Nepal – ICJ welcomes NHRC as constitutional body: 
Raises concerns regarding independence of appointments 
process”, International Commission of Jurists press release, 
Geneva, 24 January 2007. 
243 On a visit to Nepal, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Louise Arbour emphasised that ending 
impunity and resolving cases of forced disappearance would 
not jeopardise the peace process and should not be sidelined, 
statement to the press, 24 January 2007, Kathmandu. Her 
strong statement was partly in response to criticism that 
OHCHR should not pressure the government on internal 
matters. See “HR bodies should be careful not to disturb 
communal harmony, PM tells Arbour”, Kathmandu Post, 21 
January 2007.  
244 For UNMIN responsibilities, see Appendix B below. 
245 Crisis Group interviews, donors, Kathmandu, October 
2006. 
246 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2006. 
simply enriching NGOs may be tinged with political 
partisanship but cannot be dismissed out of hand.247 
Donors should also consider ways of “bringing more 
ideas into the slipstream” while building up Nepali 
civil society.248 An example of how indigenous 
thinking can be supported while enhancing the 
general quality of debate is the already mentioned 
UNDP/International IDEA-funded volume of essays 
on constitutional topics by Nepali scholars.249 Such a 
book can feed into press and radio discussion of 
issues250 and inform intra-party debates. Some overlap 
in efforts is inevitable but UNDP has established a 
centralised database of projects related to constitutional 
education;251 UNMIN’s responsibility for electoral 
assistance, coupled with its civil affairs capacity, may 
provide additional coordination capacity. 
Ongoing development assistance. The bulk of 
foreign help still comes as development aid. Major 
bilateral and multilateral donors adapted to the 
changed circumstances of the conflict but have been 
quick to revert to more traditional practices as the 
peace process has taken hold. However, development 
engagement does not take place in a vacuum; it can 
affect the constitutional and political process. Some 
institutions may not appreciate the delicacy of the 
interim environment; for example, the World Bank’s 
strong pressure on the government to liberalise labour 
laws does not take into account problems of the SPA 
administration’s legitimacy and the potential 
unpopularity of such measures.252 
More broadly, increased attention to the need for 
inclusive development will be hard to translate into 
action without determined leadership. Aid institutions 
largely reflect the established social hierarchy, are 
often professionally and politically conservative and 
may resist social change. Still, the donor community 
 
 
247 Crisis Group interview, Baburam Bhattarai, Bhaktapur, 16 
October 2006. 
248 Crisis Group interview, senior journalist, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. 
249 Crisis Group interview, Yash Ghai, Lalitpur, October 2006.  
250 FM radio, which includes national and local commercial 
stations as well as a successful non-profit community sector, is 
probably the most effective vehicle for disseminating 
information outside the Kathmandu valley. Print has an 
increasing reach, with news weeklies such as Himal 
Khabarpatrika, Nepal and Samay distributed nationwide and a 
profusion of local papers, but print media are still constrained 
by poor rural distribution networks and low literacy rates. 
251 Crisis Group interview, UNDP staff members, Kathmandu, 
October 2006. 
252 Crisis Group interview, senior Western donor, Kathmandu, 
January 2007. 
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has tools and mechanisms that can help it chart a 
constructive course. The Basic Operating Guidelines 
that were developed in a conflict context may remain 
relevant as a means for pressuring all sides to behave 
responsibly.253 The postponed Nepal Development 
Forum,254 which brings together donors and the 
government, may go ahead as a Peace and 
Development Forum which could consider the links 
between development and the political process and 
build a more solid base for a coordinated approach. 
 
 
253 The Basic Operating Guidelines were developed by a 
consortium of major European donors in collaboration with 
the UN. 
254 This biannual forum should have convened in 2006 but 
was postponed because of the unfavourable political situation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s constitution-making process has tough targets 
to meet: it must conclusively settle the decade-long 
civil war and build a solid foundation to address deep-
rooted ethnic, caste and social divisions. It has to 
achieve this while consolidating a weakened democracy 
and building public participation. Balancing elite and 
mass concerns and paying appropriate attention to 
both substantive and procedural issues is far from 
straightforward. 
Mainstream political parties will remain key actors, 
especially if they seize this opportunity to increase 
their inclusiveness, promote internal democracy and 
tackle the worst excesses of patronage. The Maoists 
were a driving force for a CA. They now have to 
translate the achievement of this goal into votes – and 
work hard to prove that their movement can adapt 
itself to democratic rules. Other political parties, civil 
society and the international community should 
maintain pressure on them to keep their promise to 
abandon violence. The SPA in particular can also 
promote Maoist engagement by committing to clear 
processes, meeting agreed deadlines and doing more 
to lead by example when demonstrating democratic 
values. 
Both mainstream parties and Maoists would benefit 
from richer internal debates on constitutional issues. It 
may be that many options are quietly being 
considered by party leaders, and certainly the media 
and special interest groups are not short of proposals. 
But there is no substitute for a wider debate which 
links parties’ internal discussions to broader popular 
concerns. Similarly, transparency of policy discussion 
and the decision-making process should extend from 
the interim period into the CA itself. If that body is 
seen to proceed in a legitimate and relatively 
democratic manner, it will be more difficult for any 
political actor to repudiate its product or for the public 
to wish to do so. 
Even a successful CA cannot in itself resolve the 
social and political conflicts that fuelled the Maoist 
insurgency. As the recent flare-up of tension in the 
Tarai has shown, these can take on new, more virulent 
forms until they are more fully addressed. 
Nevertheless, the constitution-making process is the 
best opportunity to reshape state structures and reform 
the political parties that will have to consolidate 
democracy and prevent a return to violent conflict. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 26 February 2007 
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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1740 (2007) 
 
The Security Council, 
Welcoming the signing on 21 November by the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) of 
a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the stated commitment of both parties to transforming the existing ceasefire 
into a permanent and sustainable peace and commending the steps taken to date to implement the Agreement, 
Taking note of the request of the parties for United Nations assistance in implementing key aspects of the 
Agreement, in particular monitoring of arrangements relating to the management of arms and armed personnel of 
both sides and election monitoring, 
Recalling the letter of the Secretary-General of 22 November 2006 (S/2006/920) and the statement of its President of 
1 December (S/PRST/2006/49), and welcoming progress made in dispatching an advance deployment of monitors 
and electoral personnel to Nepal, 
Recognizing the strong desire of the Nepalese people for peace and the restoration of democracy and the importance 
in this respect of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and encouraging the parties to maintain 
that momentum, 
Recognizing the need to pay special attention to the needs of women, children and traditionally marginalized groups in 
the peace process, as mentioned in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
Welcoming the Secretary-General’s report of 9 January 2007 (S/2007/7) and having considered its recommendations, 
which are based on the request of the signatories of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the findings of the 
technical assessment mission, 
Expressing its readiness to support the peace process in Nepal in the timely and effective implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Nepal and its ownership of the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 
Expressing appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Representative, the United 
Nations Country Team including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other United Nations 
representatives in Nepal, 
1. Decides to establish a United Nations political mission in Nepal (UNMIN) under the leadership of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and with the following mandate based on the recommendations of the 
Secretary-General in his report: 
(a) To monitor the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, in line with the provisions of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; 
(b) To assist the parties through a Joint Monitoring Coordinating Committee in implementing their agreement 
on the management of arms and armed personnel of both sides, as provided for in that agreement; 
(c) To assist in the monitoring of the ceasefire arrangements; 
(d) To provide technical support for the planning, preparation and conduct of the election of a Constituent 
Assembly in a free and fair atmosphere, in consultation with the parties; 
(e) To provide a small team of electoral monitors to review all technical aspects of the electoral process, 
and report on the conduct of the election; 
2. Decides that the mandate of UNMIN, in view of the particular circumstances, will be for a period of 12 
months from the date of this resolution, and expresses its intention to terminate or further extend that mandate 
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upon request of the Government of Nepal, taking into consideration the Secretary-General’s expectation that 
UNMIN will be a focussed mission of limited duration; 
3. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal that his Special Representative will coordinate the United Nations 
effort in Nepal in support of the peace process, in close consultation with the relevant parties in Nepal and in 
close cooperation with other international actors; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress in implementing this resolution; 
5. Requests the parties in Nepal to take the necessary steps to promote the safety, security and freedom of 
movement of UNMIN and associated personnel in executing the tasks defined in the mandate; 
6. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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